


# KARABAGH CONFLICT AND PROSPECTS OF ITS RESOLUTION




## **FOCUS-GROUP DISCUSSIONS**

- **The Upper Qarabag problem from the standpoint of Azerbaijani respondents**
- **The problem of Mountainous Karabagh as viewed by Armenian respondents**

## **MASS MEDIA MONITORING**

- **Monitoring of Azerbaijani media**
- **Monitoring of Armenian media**
- **Monitoring of Mountainous Karabagh media**



**KARABAGH CONFLICT  
AND PROSPECTS  
OF ITS RESOLUTION**

**(The results of focus-group discussions  
and mass media monitoring in  
Azerbaijan, Armenia and  
Mountainous Karabagh)**

**THIS PROJECT IMPLEMENTED WITH THE SUPPORT  
OF THE MASS MEDIA NETWORK PROGRAM OF THE  
OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE**

## INTRODUCTION

During the period of February 1, 2002 - January 31, 2003, Baku and Yerevan Press Clubs with the support of OSI Network Media Program implemented "Azerbaijani-Armenian/Armenian-Azerbaijani Information Center" project.

This initiative was maximally oriented to the present-day reality. The two partnering organizations have concluded that it is obviously insufficient to call upon journalists to be objective, tolerant, not to intensify the existing tension in the region. Conditions must be set to get most complete information about the neighbor, because a decade and a half have passed since the time when the communication between Azerbaijanis and Armenians was unimpeded and we knew each other due to daily mass contacts in every sphere. Over this time both Azerbaijan and Armenia have changed greatly, a generation has grown up, who have quite shallow notions about what people are like in the neighboring country and what this country itself is like.

Media are actually the only channel, enabling to sustain public awareness about each other and the problems that exist between us. What the ideas of Azerbaijanis about Armenians are today and vice versa, what their feelings are with regard to conflict resolution, how important these issues are in press and from what perspectives they are covered, how adequate media are in meeting the information demand of the public - this is the subject of research, the findings of which are published in this brochure.

The methodology for the research was chosen to be monitoring of the mainstream media along with focus group research in Azerbaijan, Armenia as well as in Mountainous Karabagh separately. We conducted a similar research in 2001 under the project of "Karabagh Conflict in the Mirror of Media and Public Opinion of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Mountainous Karabagh", also supported by OSI. However, this time, while retaining the comparability of results, we tried to "go deeper" and for this reason the traditional opinion poll technique was replaced by a focus group research and monitoring object was placed much emphasis on.

The materials presented here are one of the main products of the project. Its components are also the satellite press-conferences between Baku and Yerevan enabling Azerbaijani and Armenian journalists to ask direct questions to the politicians of the neighboring country, receive first-hand information. And joint trips of journalists of the two countries to other regions, entangled in interethnic conflicts, allowed to see our situation in a broader context. We hope the project helped the media to better realize their role of a communication bridge, without which constructive dialogue between the parties on any level is impossible.

As it has been mentioned in the foreword to the brochure on the past year research, any solution must be based on real facts and information, knowledge of situation, sentiment and trends. This is what we try to define in their dynamics, addressing the results of our work to journalists and politicians, international mediators and public at large in our countries. However complicated the relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia are, deepening of alienation, uncertainty in these relations can lead us to a dead-end ultimately. For this reason, despite the huge controversy in approaches and evaluations of the parties - shown also by the results of our research - it is necessary to resist the mutual isolation, use all the possibilities for information exchange and search for elements of consensus in the mass of controversies. This aim unites all of us, working on the project.

### **THE UPPER QARABAG PROBLEM FROM THE STANDPOINT OF AZERBAIJANI RESPONDENTS**

#### **Objectives and brief description of the survey program**

In May-August 2002, a group of sociologists carried out a survey in Azerbaijan using the survey methodology of focus groups. The objective of the survey was to study what different categories of the population think about the current status and prospects for resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani Upper Qarabag problem. The survey was a logical continuation of a large-scale (more than 1,000 people) public opinion poll dedicated to the same problem and carried out exactly one year ago.

A total of 14 focus groups were made up. They included:

Secondary school teachers (women), doctors (men), oil-workers, communication workers (women), entrepreneurs (men), housewives, university students (men and women), residents of the Tovuz District which borders on Armenia (men and women), refugees from Armenia (men and women), internally displaced persons from Qarabag (men and women). Each group included eight to 12 people. Discussions lasted for an average of 1.5 hours in accordance with a previously prepared scenario (see Attachment 1).

Before the discussions, members of the focus groups filled out special questionnaires. Besides social and demographic information about themselves, all members of the groups indicated the names of media outlets that they thought were the main source of information about the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and defined the degree of their trust to the information carried by these media outlets. The information obtained allows a conclusion to be drawn that television channels have a significant lead among sources of information and are followed by newspapers, while the radio holds the last position. As for whose information is the most credible, Azerbaijani members of focus groups rated pro-government media as the most credible, independent as second and opposition as third. The overwhelming majority of respondents stated that they give preference to local mass media as a source of information about the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. This breakdown of answers is explained by the fact that the materials of local mass media on the problem do not differ much from each other, while the audience of pro-government television and radio channels is much bigger thanks to numerous technological advantages than that of independent and opposition-minded media.

The main survey program was intended to find out: to which extent do the different groups of the Azerbaijani and Armenian population realize the danger of the resumption of military action; how acceptable is a forcible solution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict to respondents; what are the limits of possible compromise in a negotiated settlement and what is the extent of confidence in international mediators. The selection of questions was largely preconditioned by the fact that the conflict has long been in a "neither-peace-nor-war" status and in hanging in the air, therefore, the situation can change at any time in either direction. The understanding of the specificity of the current situation and people's expectations are probably among the most important components of the peace process. The diplomats and politicians brokering the negotiations between the parties to the conflict have repeatedly pointed to the fact that public opinion in both Azerbaijan and Armenia is not ready for vital decision-making. The current survey was intended to identify the real state of things.

The extent of activity of focus group members and the sense in what they said was not the same and varied from high (doctors, teachers, men refugees, men residents of the borderline district) to low (housewives, women residents of the borderline district). After a viewpoint for the majority of respondents was voiced, respondents often confined themselves to just joining it or got distracted from the survey topic and started talking about more pressing problems. Answers of focus group members were not interrupted, but during the discussion moderators asked respondent to concentrate on the main questions and not to get away from the topic.

The interviews in focus groups were recorded onto audio cassettes. After being transcribed, the records assumed the short-hand version. The most characteristic and repeated statements were chosen. At the same time, contrasting and interesting opinions were also registered. Respondent positions in certain groups, as well as dominating opinions on questions being discussed, were determining by means of summing up the overlapping or similar opinions.

### **Respondent statements and their assessment**

*The first question was intended to find out whether members of focus groups accept the possibility of resumption of military action between Armenia and Azerbaijan.*

The answers have identified that respondents are tired of the unending and futile attempts to resolve the conflict in peace (oil workers). Here is an example: "...if it goes on like that, there will be war by all means" (third-year student, 21 years old). Most frequently respondents think that the war will resume in five-six years. Almost all the focus groups (refugees from Armenia, displaced persons from Qarabag, etc.) believe that the reason for this is the impossibility to force Armenia to vacate the occupied Azerbaijani territories by any other means. However, the majority of focus group members don't think that any drastic changes can take place in the "neither-peace-nor-war" situation any time soon. This is mainly the consequence of the fact that the Azerbaijani army is not prepared for the war and the fact that the foreign political situation is not favorable enough. Opinions different from this one were also encountered. For instance, female communication workers think that "... as long as Heydar Aliyev is in power, there will be no war." The opinion about the reluctance of the incumbent authorities to fight for the liberation of the occupied territories was voiced by male residents of the borderline district and male doctors. Although the majority of men displaced from Qarabag were convinced of the inevitability of war, this group also expressed the following thesis: "... the Azerbaijani authorities are not capable of regaining the occupied territories by force."

The passive position of young people is also worthy of note: "Everything depends on the policy of the authorities as they can affect public opinion towards both peaceful and military solution of the conflict" (second-year student, 19 years old). Female students are more reserved in assessing the possibility of resumption of military action and rule out the possibility that Armenia can initiate that. The opposite opinion has been expressed by one of the male residents of the borderline district, who has said that military action can resume at the initiative of Armenia. Some businessmen suggested that pressure could be put on Armenia by means of arming and training the Azerbaijani army and that way the goals set forth could be achieved even without starting the hostilities.

Summing up answers to this question one can draw a conclusion that the majority of focus group members do not want or expect in the foreseeable future the resumption of military action. At the same time, even more respondents think that in order to liberate the occupied Azerbaijani lands, Azerbaijan will have to take up arms anyway, but that will happen only when a patriotic government is formed in Baku and the army becomes combat-ready.

*Answers to the second question were to find out respondent opinions about the extent of Azerbaijan's readiness for a large-scale military action, as well as the would-be results of such course of developments.*

In the sociological survey of 2001, 32.6 per cent of respondent had spoken exclusively in favor of a negotiated settlement to the Qarabag problem, while 13 per cent advocated war. More than half of respondents regarded a military option possible if peace talks yield no fruit.

During the current survey opinions diverged almost in all groups. They ranged from "...I can say with a sense of responsibility that Azerbaijan is ready for military action" (second-year student, 19 years old) to "Azerbaijan has taken advantage of the cease-fire period to step up its military potential" (second-year MBA student, 24 years old). When the capabilities of the countries were compared, it was said: "Azerbaijan will have enough strength to win the war with Armenia" (fourth-year student, 21 years old). At the same time, focus group members believe that "Armenia will be supported by its strategic allies in the region" (female students). Therefore, Azerbaijan's victory is being forecast only "...if the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan is wages one on one" (third-year student, 21 years old). Yet, the majority thinks that Armenia still has military superiority over us and in case of resumption of military action Azerbaijan can suffer another defeat or fail to achieve its objectives due to heavy human loss. The main drawback of the Azerbaijani army is the weak morale. Men who have been displaced from Qarabag, when saying that Azerbaijan is not prepared for war, have blamed the country's administration for this. Those who think that Azerbaijan is superior (oil workers) and are confident of the success of the armed forces attribute this primarily to the catastrophic state of things in the Armenian economy. Female communication workers believe in Azerbaijan's victory, but think that it is first of all necessary to ensure the cohesion and unity of society and gain firm support of the Muslim world. Men doctors think that the support of fraternal Turkey could guarantee Azerbaijan's victory. A rather contradictory position has been taken by women teachers. Most of them said Azerbaijan was not prepared for war, but were sure of its victory in case of resumption of the hostilities. The same category of respondents was weary of the enormous human losses. Answers of residents of the borderline Tovuz District were rather unexpected too. While men said Azerbaijan was not prepared for war due to rife corruption and lack of patriotism of the incumbent authorities ("...Azerbaijan can secure a victory but not under the current authorities"), women, given their natural discreetness and peacefulness, said they were sure of Azerbaijan's victory. Entrepreneurs think that for the war to be waged successfully, it is necessary to put the economy on military rails, mobilize all the resources for the victory, namely by raising officers' salaries to \$1,000 per month.

Thus, if we sum up answers to the second question, a conclusion can be made that most of the focus group members believe in Azerbaijan's eventual victory due to its greater human and economic potential than Armenian. However, respondents don't think that their country is prepared for an immediate resumption of military action. The main obstacles in the way are said to be the lack of national cohesion and insufficient foreign support.

*The third question represented a switch from general discussion to concrete positions of respondents in the event of resumption of military action, because it was intended to identify people's readiness to personally take part in the military action or to send their close ones and relatives to the front.*

"I won't be asked, if it is necessary I will simply be made to go" (fourth-year student, 21 years old) - this is probably the most typical answer to this question in this category. None of the student respondents expressed desire to volunteer to join the Azerbaijani armed forces. The opposite picture was observed among men doctors, oil workers, refugees, residents of the borderline Tovuz District and businessmen, the vast majority of whom didn't only express their readiness to take part in the liberation of the occupied territories, but also to send their close ones and relatives to the frontline. A contrasting position was taken by the displaced persons from Qarabag. While all men expressed their readiness to volunteer for the front in case

of resumption of military action, the overwhelming majority of women didn't feel like sending their sons to war. They explained their motives by saying that "...their sacrifice won't be appreciated in Azerbaijan", "only the children of the poor fight in the war", etc. Female refugees from Armenia unequivocally stated that should the liberation of the occupied territories start, it is the children of the well-to-do families who have to show the example of patriotism. Then everyone else will go and fight as well, they said. Female teachers, though saying that they are ready to take part in the military action, don't feel like sending their children to the front. Oil workers have also agreed that "war is not only for the poor". They made some critical remarks about Azerbaijani mass media because there are not enough programs and materials about the military and patriotic propaganda. Men doctors, the overwhelming majority of whom have also expressed readiness to participate in the liberation of Azerbaijani territories, pointed to the need to heed more attention to war veterans and the handicapped. It was also indicated that some defeatist moods were being spread by certain people. Men residing in the borderline district have expressed a similar point of view, saying that they are all ready to stand up for the liberation of Azerbaijani territories despite the "lack of confidence in the commander-in-chief", "poor preparation of the army" and "the defeatist moods being spread by the authorities".

A conclusion can be drawn from the answers that most of respondents have displayed readiness to carry out their duty to defend the Motherland. At the same time, there are aspects that bring into question the sincerity of such answers: for instance, the readiness of women and elderly people to take up guns looks rather showy. Besides, the significant proportion of those making no secret of their reluctance or being not ready to take part in the war for the liberation of the occupied territories testifies to the anti-war moods in society or, which is probably more likely the case, indifference.

*The fourth question was intended to identify what different categories of the population understand and imply by such notions as "mutual concessions" and "reaching a compromise between Azerbaijan and Armenia".*

The most widespread opinion is that there aren't and can't be any compromises in the issue of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Only one respondent (female fourth-year student) admitted the possibility of resuming limited economic cooperation between the parties to the conflict until a political solution to the problem is reached in an effort to create a favorable atmosphere around the ongoing peace talks. According to the overwhelming majority of focus group members, the limit of concessions for Azerbaijan is the autonomy for Upper Qarabag. But, according to them, the Armenian party is unlikely to agree to that. This approach could be seen in such typical statements as "Azerbaijan cannot make any more compromise (second-year MBA student, 24 years old), "...Armenia won't make any concessions (fourth-year student, 21 years old). Some people think that it would be an acceptable compromise to restore the situation that existed before 1988 (refugees from Armenia) and guaranteeing the Azerbaijanis the right to live in Armenia and the Armenians in Azerbaijan (residents of the borderline district and oil workers). Men entrepreneurs believe that Azerbaijani lands outside Upper Qarabag have to be freed without any conditions, as is demanded by the UN Security Council resolutions. Other questions, they think, are negotiable. An opinion was voiced among men doctors that if Armenia recognizes Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, it will be possible to provide the Armenians with a high status of autonomy. Men residing in the borderline district have also expressed an extreme point of view, "... to expel all the Armenians from Azerbaijan just as Azerbaijanis were ousted from Armenia and to close the border", though the majority of this category, as was stated above, do regard it acceptable to restore the pre-war status. Women teachers have voiced their scepticism towards the capacity of the public to effectively influence the state's choice of resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

In general, focus group members, regardless of the social status, have demonstrated their reluctance to make further concessions and showed some mistrust to the effectiveness of fresh compromises.

*The fifth question had to do with respondents' attitude to mediators' efforts to resolve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in peace.*

In this question, the opinions of Azerbaijani members of focus groups polarized, ranging from positive assessments to wishes to reject mediators' services. The latter opinion, in fact, was encountered much more frequently. Such opinions were expressed by all categories of respondents. Solidarity by an absolute majority of respondents was displayed only in the recognition of the futility of many-year-long efforts of mediators in resolving the conflict. This is one of the typical answers: "As is evident, in an almost 10-year period of cease-fire, the mediation has not brought about any results" (second-year student, 18 years old). Female communication workers were noted for mistrust in the impartiality of mediators. And here is the opinion of men doctors: "Mediators only delay the conflict solution". Women from Qarabag spoke about their readiness to support the efforts of mediators, but only provided their activity becomes more effective. Suggestions were made to attract Turkey (internally displaced persons from Qarabag, women residing in the borderline district) and NATO (a refugee from Armenia) to mediate. The majority of men doctors stick to the opinion that international mediators will be needed after the Azerbaijani lands are liberated by force in order to establish a lasting peace in the region. Businessmen underlined the importance of the role the USA and Russia could play in resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Female teachers think that "we ought to rely on ourselves" and blame the international community and international organizations for being inconsistent in the issue of protection of territorial integrity of states. Many men residing in the borderline district were more categorical in voicing their frustration with the international community: it has "... to both recognize Armenia as an aggressor state and demand an unconditional liberation of Azerbaijani territories". One of them, voicing his scepticism over the work of international organizations, stated openly that "... it does not serve to reach peace but to support the current Azerbaijani authorities". Those who still think that international mediation efforts must continue believe: this has to be done in accordance with the UN and the OSCE mandate and in strict conformity with the principles of international law. Housewives have displayed unanimity in their hopes that the problems between the conflicting parties would be resolved through negotiations brokered by international mediators. There is little logic in this, because the majority of housewives simultaneously believe that the Minsk Group's efforts are not productive.

## **Conclusion**

Drawing a general conclusion, the following can be noted:

Although the overwhelming majority of respondents do not expect and are not interested in the resumption of military action, they are also against any further concessions on the part of Azerbaijan and don't believe in compromise. Mediators' efforts toward a negotiated settlement of the conflict do not cause a particular optimism either. Passive public opinion and the readiness to tread the authorities' line in the "peace or war" issue is in evidence. At the same time, public opinion is more prepared to put up with the further conservation of the "neither-peace-nor-war" status than to take advantage of Azerbaijan's economic superiority to strengthen the army and, given the favorable foreign political circumstances, restore the territorial integrity of the country by force. Therefore, most of Azerbaijanis are not prepared to go for a comprehensive peace accord at the expense of significant concessions. Consequently, a stage-by-stage solution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict seems more realistic, as it would leave the most arguable points aside for the time being and enable to alleviate tensions in bilateral relations and eliminate the threat of an inevitable resumption of hostilities. It is



always easier to deal with pivotal issues in the atmosphere of growing mutual confidence.

After the discussion was completed, the moderator asked respondents to identify what they thought were the most important questions of all those considered in the focus group. The majority thinks that these were the questions about the possibility and consequences of the resumption of war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, about the readiness of the parties for military action, personal readiness of people to take part in the military action, and about ways of resolving the conflict in peace. A similar sequence could be seen in the activity and interest of focus group members when these questions were discussed. Focus group members spontaneously raised questions not pertaining to the theme being discussed. These included: serious breaches of social justice, corrupt authorities, lack of cohesion in society, poor well-being of society, etc.

During the discussion, focus group members referred to mass media extremely rarely. And when such referenced were made, they were very general: “it was written in newspapers...”, “it was shown on TV...”, etc. Specific newspapers or TV channels were not named, not to mention the names of specific publications or television programs.

Of the 14 focus groups, the most non-reconciliatory position with regard to the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict was taken by men from among the internally displaced persons from Qarabag, while the most conciliatory position was voiced by housewives. The most loyal to the authorities were female teachers, communication workers and refugees from Armenia, while the most critical were men doctors and residents of the borderline district.

## **GUIDE OF THE INTERVIEW WITH A FOCUS GROUP**

### **Assessment of the current status and prospects for a military or negotiated solution to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict**

#### **Introduction** (10 minutes).

Hello. My name is Ilham Rzayev. I am a sociologist. We are conducting this survey in order to identify the sources of information and public expectations regarding the prospects for resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Upper Qarabag. A kind of a round-table discussion is to be held today and I will tell you what it will be like. Don't be bashful, please say whatever you think. There can be no correct or incorrect answers, because people's opinions and attitudes towards these questions are different. Besides, we are very few here. I will record our conversation on a tape. Subsequently these records will be available only to me and, of course, they will not be shown to any other audience. I need this because there will be several discussions of this kind and without the records it may be very difficult to rebuild what was happening and what answers were given in each focus group. Do you agree to take part? Do you have any questions?

#### **Familiarization** (10 minutes)

First of all, I would like to introduce yourselves and say a few words about who you are. Your name, how old you are, where and in what capacity you work. Please answer in turn and don't wait for the interviewer to ask you in person, if you are ready go ahead.

#### **The main part** (60-75 minutes)

As you may know, the process of a negotiated settlement of the Qarabag conflict, being handled by a special Minsk Group set up under the auspices of the OSCE, has not yet brought about any tangible results. Over the past 10 years, a number of diplomatic visits, consultations and negotiations were held. The three alternative solutions offered by the Minsk Group were rejected by the parties to the conflict as being incompetent even for discussion. No breakthrough was achieved even after the process of negotiations was joined by the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents, as well as such world leaders as Jacques Chirac, Vladimir Putin, Colin Powell, etc. It has proved extremely difficult to bring together Azerbaijan, which insists on the restoration of its territorial integrity, and the Armenians, who demand a de facto recognition of Upper Qarabag's independence. A whole host of the UN Security Council resolutions demanding an unconditional withdrawal of the Armenian army from the occupied Azerbaijani territories are not being implemented. At a time when prospects for resolving the conflict seem rather vague, public sentiments in favor of the resumption of military action have come to the fore in Azerbaijan, as calls are being made by politicians, in mass media, in the statements by political parties and public associations.

**The purpose** of our discussion is to identify different opinions about the danger of the resumption of military action between Azerbaijan and Armenia, determine a situation when public opinion would be opposed to a military solution to the Qarabag problem or support it, and to assess the possibility of reaching a negotiated settlement on the basis of compromise. Our questions are defined in the following way:

Do you accept the possibility of resumption of military action between Armenia and Azerbaijan due to the impossibility of reaching a negotiated settlement.

1. Is Azerbaijan ready for military action? Will the new war bring about a dramatic change in the situation? If so, will it be in favor of Azerbaijan or Armenia?
2. Are you ready to take part in the new war or send your close relatives to the front?

3. What do you understand by such notions as “compromise” and “mutual concessions” on the part of Armenia and Azerbaijan?
4. What steps by the parties to the conflict and the international community could prevent the resumption of war?
5. What is your opinion about the role of mediators (international organizations, other countries) in resolving the conflict?

**Conclusion** (10 minutes)

Do you think there is something important that we didn't say or discuss today? What did you think was the most interesting and important? Thank you for your participation and detailed answers.

### **THE PROBLEM OF MOUNTAINOUS KARABAGH AS VIEWED BY ARMENIAN RESPONDENTS**

#### **Introduction**

The research presented herein has been implemented under the project of Yerevan and Baku Press Clubs with the support OSI Network Media Program. The project continues the public opinion study on the Karabagh conflict undertaken in 2001. The public opinion polls and the interviews of decision-makers conducted at that time outlined the existing attitudes on the MK issue.

Yet the application of a standardized interview with a questionnaire makes it hard to determine the motivation, the various social and psychological aspects behind the public opinion. To achieve this, the research group tried to obtain well argument, detailed answers to a number of essential questions referring to Mountainous Karabagh by means free interpersonal discussions in focus groups, applying non-formalized or semi-formalized interview methodology. Thus the present research was aimed at determining the explicit or implicit verbal and non-verbal attitudes to MK problem on the level of groups or individuals.

The specifics of the conflict results in stages of antagonism intensification of various extents followed by long latent phases, yet the climate of hostility of the parties is still preserved. For this reason we deemed the application of monitoring approach to be ineffective as it is intended for a quick situation change and appropriate modifications in the public attitudes, destruction of stereotypes and attitudes on the socio-psychological level.

Our specific task was thus to determine the rational and emotional factors behind the beliefs that the public opinion is based on or is shaped with. In doing that we proceeded from the notion that the focused study of political problems has certain peculiarities. First of all, it must be stated that the subject of the study, especially such a major issue as Karabagh conflict, is much broader than the interests of specific social groups. At the same time, the opinions of these latter ones are not localized by age, education, profession and other categories.

For this reason the focus group selection technique was prompted by the necessity to determine the opinions, attitudes and motivations on the subject which are most characteristic for the whole society. In this regard the following 14 focus groups were involved in the Armenian part of research, each of them comprising 9-12 people:

- students (male/female),
- refugees (male/female),
- residents of Mountainous Karabagh (male/female),
- residents of borderline Tavush region (male/female),
- teachers (female) and doctors (male),
- workers (male/female),
- housewives (female) and entrepreneurs (male).

The gender-based segmentation of the groups pursued a purely pragmatic purpose to exclude the tension that could have arisen while discussing the problem in mixed group.

In group selection the researchers assumed that the easiest flow of a discussion could only occur among people knowing each other or in groups experienced in interpersonal communication, during which the problem in question had been discussed in various aspects.

It should be noted that in the survey of 2001 24% of respondents noted that the MK problem is a subject for discussion in interpersonal communication.

Since for a public opinion study by means of a non-formalized interview the representative opinion in terms of the socio-demographic parameters is not an obligatory condition, the discussions were mostly conducted in groups, representing the social segments which have been in immediate and personal contact with Karabagh problem. In our opinion, the following groups belong to this category: the residents of Karabagh, refugees, doctors who have dealt with patients wounded during the war, teachers, whose former students participated in the military actions as volunteers, the residents of Tavush region, bordering with Azerbaijan. The groups of entrepreneurs, housewives, students and workers were in fact "test" groups and served to determine how common the opinions voiced in the "experimental" groups are for public at large.

Certain parallelisms in the findings of the present research and that of 2001 allow to suppose that the results are relevant to each other and the information gathered and analyzed can be considered typical for the public opinion of Armenia in terms of evaluations, judgments and argumentation, as characteristic of the attitudes on the MK problem. The cross-tabulation of the findings by the socio-demographic parameters of 145 respondents composing 14 focus groups and the sociological survey of 2001 (1000 respondents) allow to understand the proportions of these parameters in the two researches (**See Appendix, Table 1**). (In both cases the sample composition was not initially planned, but produced in an experiment).

In the course of the research an attempt to determine the media influences on the public opinion was made. To this effect media were monitored during the period from March and July 2002 along with the focus group research. In the discussions the data on the information availability for each of the respondents and their reliance on electronic and print media was also recorded. 59.7% of respondents on the day that preceded the meeting used either only the TV channel or a number of media sources, where the TV channel was present.

The analysis of the transcripts of the focus groups discussion was based on coding used in media monitoring. The opinions and evaluations made were separated from the audio text as judgements meaningful paragraphs, sentences that are logically and grammatically linked.

The content of the discussion was grouped by the following thematic categories:

- thematic category "A", including the opinions on the military and peaceful resolution;
- thematic category "B", including the ideas on whether Armenia is ready to engage in military actions;
- thematic category "C" represents the judgments on the preparedness of respondents participate personally (or have their family members participate) in the possible military actions;
- thematic category "D" represents the opinions on compromise and the limit of mutual concessions to be made by the parties;
- thematic category "E" presents judgments on the role of international organizations in the conflict resolution.

The total duration of discussions on MK problem and associated subjects took 26 hours (1560 minute) in the groups. 309 minutes of these were taken by the preparatory statements and questions by the moderator. Thus, 1251 minutes were given to the discussion of MK problem as such. The duration of the interviews in the groups ranges from 60 to 120 minutes.

The total number of judgments/ analysis units along all the thematic categories came to 1636.

The classification of judgements on each of the thematic categories is presented in the Appendix (**Table 2**).

**Thematic category "A":**

**Peaceful and military ways of conflict resolution**

The number of judgements made on the subject is 207.

When considering the "peace or war" alternative the focus groups paid special attention to the uncompromising position of Azerbaijan, the militaristic statements of the political leaders of the country and the opposition. Opinions were voiced to the effect that the political elite abuses the Karabagh problem in the inner political debates, maintains the tension among the refugees artificially, intensifies the revenge-seeking hysteria. It was noted that the threat to renew the military actions proceeds from Azerbaijan only. (The groups of doctors, students, residents of Tavush region).

The groups of Karabagh residents express their concern over the strengthening of Azerbaijani army. The respondents are worried over the rapprochement of Azerbaijan with NATO, the announced intentions of establishing military bases in Azerbaijan. Anxiety is voiced that the military assistance provided by Turkey and the USA will be directed against Armenia.

It was also stressed that Mountainous Karabagh cannot give up the actually gained independence and in the dead-end of today there remains a danger that Azerbaijan will attempt to restart the war against MK and Armenia. At the same time the discussion participants believe that the intermediaries, particularly Russia, will prevent a new war from starting, and their majority supports the continuation of the negotiations process on the peaceful resolution. At the same time the respondents are little informed about the changes in the negotiation level, which have lately been conducted by the Deputy Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and believe that after the last year meetings of the two Presidents in Paris and Key West there is little probability of success in the negotiations process.

All the female groups speaking on the issue stressed the necessity of solving the conflict in peace only, the majority of respondents in male groups shared this attitude. There has been a noteworthy opinion voiced in the group of students:

- I have recently been in Karabagh and got the impression that the people of Karabagh do want a war to gain some territories, in particular Getashen and Shahumian. They miss the war...

Notably, during the discussions of the same category in the female groups (especially those of refugees and teachers) the compassion to the mothers of Azerbaijan who lost their sons in battles was expressed.

- They (Azerbaijanis) do not want a war either, they had losses just like we did, the war brought much grief.

- The problem must only be solved in peace.

At the same time there is understanding that the negotiations can procrastinate, the fears that this will enable Azerbaijan to prepare and start a war are expressed. The respondents think this reason to be underlying the uncompromising position of Azerbaijan in the negotiations.

The attitude of the respondent to the peaceful or military ways of conflict resolution is depicted in **Table 3** of the Appendix.

**Thematic category "B":**

**Readiness of Armenia for military actions**

The number of judgments on the subject is 417.

In the research conducted in 2001 69.6% of respondents advocated the peaceful resolution of the MK conflict, while 1.4% of respondents spoke in favor of the military resolution. 23.9% of respondents thought the military resolution possible if the peace negotiations fail to yield results.

The focus group research aimed at determining the ideas and opinions of the discussion participants about the preparedness of the parties to resume military actions. The respondents were offered to assess the potential of Armenia, while the parameters of the assessment were not specified by the moderator. Thus, the groups could arbitrarily select the factors and their combinations. This allowed defining the dimensions of economic, inner political, moral potentials of the country. The following quotations, assessing the economic condition of Armenia, can serve as an illustration:

- Do we have a development program for Armenia? This is the most important question, all the rest is secondary. (Doctors, male group).

- The strength of any country is the industry, whereas Armenia has no industry. 90% of the enterprises are idle. (Entrepreneurs, male group).

- People need to have jobs, the standard of living must be increased, only after this can we talk about the need to fight. (Workers, male group).

In the discussion of whether Armenia is ready for a war the respondents often link the subject to their own socio-economic condition, the dissatisfaction with the activities of the authorities who do not pay much attention to the development of economics, availability of jobs.

The examples of delays in salary payments, the expensive utilities, etc. are quoted.

- In that war the nation was unified, now it is disintegrated. There is no unity between power and people. (Workers, male group).

- One cannot live with 3,000 drams of pension, these 3,000 - 4,000 can only cover the electricity expense. (Housewives).

- The budget of the country is empty, how can it fight a war?..

- The life is easier for women than men. Women can work for a small salary, say, 15,000 drams, but men would never do that, and they need to provide for their families.

- A man cannot go to war if he is not sure that his family is provided for. He will not have the spirit to go, and I will not have the spirit to stay (workers, female group).

- Corruption impeded the development. We need to reform the judicial system... (Residents of Tavush region, male group).

The refugee group paid much attention to the issue of compensating for the property lost. A secondary subject was also explored that of dissatisfaction with the authorities and officials of different rank, who "instead of thinking about people only think about becoming richer". (Groups of housewives, entrepreneurs).

Despite the dissatisfaction with authorities the groups express confidence that the leadership of the country defend the interests of Armenia with regard to Karabagh settlement, do everything possible to strengthen the military capacity of the army. Here many people find it difficult to make assessment, saying this is a task for the experts:

- Experts claim our army is the strongest in the region. (Workers, male group).

- Defense Minister said our country is ready to fight aggression back, and we believe him. (Workers, female group).

At the same time opinions are expressed that "a hungry soldier cannot fight, and it is not only the soldiers that are hungry, but their families, too" (Group of teachers).

- Many people have become rich during the war, generals buy plants and factories. (Group of workers, male)

- They provide better food in the army now. (Doctors, male group).

- No one can answer the question of whether Armenia is ready for the war, we do not know, we have no information (refugees, male group).

As respondents believe, the country will be ready for a war, when the economy is efficient and a generation of people is bred who have a sense of civil duty.

- There no citizens in Armenia, there is only population. (Students, male group).

- One must be ready for a war, our people are. (MK residents, male group).

- No social conditions can restrain the survival instinct. The protection of the soil you live on is an instinct. (Residents of Tavush region, male group).

Opinions on the moral spirit of the nation, the feeling of patriotism were sometimes related to the economic condition of the country, the social standing, the alienation of citizens from the state, the lack of state attention to the families of those who died at war and or were injured. In some groups (students, teachers) the issue of patriot education was stressed. Against this background, referring to history or quoting examples from daily life, the respondents came to the conclusion that "the national spirit is latent, the Karabagh problem seems secondary with all the routine, however, if the necessity arises, the patriotic spirit will awake again". A typical example quoted by the respondents in four groups those of refugees (male), teachers (female), residents of Tavush region (male), students (male):

- When Vazgen Sarkisian (the former Defense Minister of Armenian, later the Prime Minister author's note) said 500 volunteers for suicide squad were needed for a special operation, 1,500 people enlisted.

Respondents from the female teacher group told in detail about the school activities aimed at patriotism development, regrets were voiced that "we are preparing patriots, but the life teaches them otherwise".

The assessments made by the respondents with regard to the economic condition in the context "Is Armenia ready for war?" question are presented in the Appendix (**Table 4**).

The opinions of respondents on the question of whether Armenia was ready for the war in terms of the military capacity of the armed forces are shown in **Table 5** (see Appendix).

### ***Thematic category "C":***

#### **Readiness for personal participation in the military actions**

The number of judgments on the subject 143.

When considering this question the male respondents were most active, primarily the young men who have completed their military service, as well as the participants of the military actions in early 90s, the World War 2 veterans and former Soviet army officers. The answers of these participants can mostly be summarized as: "we will go if conscripted", "we won't be asked, if needed, we'll receive the call-up papers".

The residents of Mountainous Karabagh were unanimous:

- We gained independence and will fight for it.

In this group almost all respondents participated in the military actions and the issue of personal participation was often linked to work for defense system. The doctors primarily expressed their readiness to implement their professional duty during the war, rather than participate in military actions personally. The ambition to protect the land from aggression was especially emphasized also in the group of residents of bordering regions.

In the female groups only the students were unanimous: "We will all go to war, should it start".

In some case the readiness for personal participation and/or the participation of the family members and friends in the possible military action is associated by the respondents with social problems. The negative answers were recorded in particular in the female workers' group:

- I strictly object to my children fighting for Mountainous Karabagh.

In the female teachers' group this question is linked to the behavior of senior officials of the country. The judgements are illustrated by historical examples, in particular, the example of Vardan Mamikonian, the commander of 5th century, whose son was fighting by his side, while the officials of today are hiding their children from army.

- If they do the same when the country is at war, I will not let my son go to the front, a respondent says.

At the same time other opinions are voiced in this group, such as:

- We must not think there are no heroes. They are born, but they also must be supported. The children are ready to fight for their country.



Remembering the early 90s a respondent from the group of entrepreneurs noted, “During the last war I staged performances in the cold halls, tried to inspire the audience. I believe I did help the army. I will be doing the same, should the necessity arise”.

A very characteristic opinion was also voiced in the group of housewives:

- My nephew was killed at war. But if necessary, I will go myself...

The following can be named to be group opinions:

- During the last war we proved that we know how to fight. If we are compelled to do that again, we will prove it once more. (Workers, male group).

- It is well known that people of Karabagh are good warriors and their courage is doubled when the country is in danger. Should a war be imposed on us, the young and the old will go to fight together. But what will the price of the victory be?.. It is not a war of bludgeons, there will be many casualties. (Residents of Karabagh, male group).

- I took an oath of loyalty to the Armenian army and will abide by it. (Refugees, male group).

- I can say one thing about my relatives: they will all go, if it is necessary to fight again. (Refugees, female group).

In the discussions along this category the opinions are mostly presented in first person along with generalizations for the families and even the whole nation. The distribution of the judgments as voiced by the respondents with regard to participation in the possible military actions is presented in Appendix (**Table 6**).

### **Thematic category “D”:**

#### **About compromise and the limits to concessions**

The number of judgements made on the subject is 658.

The issue of compromise in all the groups was related by the respondents to the issued of MK status definition and acknowledgement. It was noted that in this very regard the parties to the conflict are of polarized opinions. The groups of Karabagh residents thought it most important to explain the reasons for Mountainous Karabagh refusing Azerbaijani administration to the public of Azerbaijan. The possible or acceptable concession limits for Armenia are linked to the definition of the MK status.

In general, the issues of compromise are viewed by the respondents to be the most complicated aspect. Since the information on the negotiations process is closed, the public can only form an opinion about it through versions of uncertain origin, disseminated by the media, as well as by the accusations made by the opposition to the address of authorities. One of the mostly commonly known versions is that of territory exchanges (corridor for corridor), named the Goble plan.

The opposition in Armenia persistently used the possibility of granting of Meghri corridor in the context of the betrayal of the present day political elite. The public opinion displays a prominent negative attitude to this option too. The Armenian authorities have repeatedly announced the plans for development of Meghri, implying the financial investments are an expression of the official policy. At the same time statements that the territorial concessions by means of Meghri will not be done were made. However, this version proved to be enduring in the public opinion, and during all of the meetings the respondents made it a discussion issue when talking about the possible mutual concessions. Shushi and Lachin were also frequently mentioned in the discussion and even the hypothetical possibility of returning these areas to Azerbaijan was viewed very negatively. The ideas on the compromise to be made by Armenia ranged from the categorical "nothing is to be returned" to concession of the territories of the so-called "security zone" around MK.

One of the respondents remembered the words of the former First Secretary of the Central Committee of Communist Party of Azerbaijan Abudrakhman Vezirov that the land is gained by blood.

- We have shed blood, we have conquered these lands. The territories around Mountainous Karabagh were once violently detached from MK and now must be owned by Karabagh. (MK residents, male group).

As a compromise it is suggested that the villages of Shahumain district and Getashen subdistrict left by the Armenian population be left to Azerbaijan. Certain judgments note the necessity to return a part of the territories of "security zone" controlled by Armenian forces with the exception of Lachin and Kelbajar. (The groups of entrepreneurs, refugees, etc.).

In some cases the mere fact of negotiations between the party who won and who lost the war is viewed to be a compromise on behalf of Armenia, and so is the consent to non-participation of MK in the negotiations process. (In all of the groups surveyed the opinion was voiced that Mountainous Karabagh must be involved in the negotiations, since this is the essential condition for consensus in the problem resolution). The fact that MK is not joined to Armenia but remains an independent, though unrecognized state is also considered to be a concession.

Azerbaijan is expected to recognize the independence of Mountainous Karabagh. An opinion is expressed that MK must not be considered to be an invaded territory.

In the group of entrepreneurs a discussion on terminology to be used broke out: "Was the Foreign Minister of Armenia correct in qualifying the "security zone" around MK as occupied territories?" The discussion echoed the response of the press and opposition to the statement of Vardan Oskanian in a TV interview. In this regard the Minister was making explanations to the public and the discussion in the group was to answer the question of whether the person who uses this term has a right to the position of Foreign Minister? The common opinion of the group was as follows: "Oskanian is a serious politician, and he knows what to say and where".

The aggregate data on the judgements of respondents on the category "About compromise and concession limits" are presented in **Table 7** (see Appendix).

### **Thematic category "E":**

#### **On the role of international organizations in the resolution of Karabagh problem**

The number of judgements on this category is 211.

When discussing this issue in the group of female refugees the respondents stated directly they had no information about the activities of international organization, and the question was removed from the agenda. In two other groups the respondent avoided the subject and spoke about the social problems. No groups made a detailed discussion of the efforts of international structures aimed at Karabagh conflict resolution, but for the group of male doctors.

In the female group of MK residents the positive activities of International Red Cross, acting as an intermediary for prisoner exchange and the difficulties faced by international organizations in this regard were discussed, in particular, a reference to the reluctance of Azerbaijan to give out the prisoners of war was made.

The judgments stressed the positive role of the OSCE Minsk Group in the negotiation process, the maintenance of cease-fire, assisted by the monitoring of the situation in the conflict zone. It was mentioned that "European organizations make it possible to meet and negotiate, insisting on the political resolution of MK problem". It was however noted that "until the role of this structure is clarified, it will be difficult to understand who they are supporting and what their purposes are".

- Azeris believe the OSCE Minsk Group has a pro-Armenian orientation. (Workers, male group).

- I have studied this organization thoroughly. They come, spend a year or two, studying the problem, and when the time for making decisions comes, the chairman is changed and the familiarization starts all over. (Doctors, male group).

- Their attitude is that of superpowers. (Students, male group).  
- OSCE in Yugoslavia defended Kosovo, which fought for independence in our region it supports Azerbaijan who does not want to recognize the independence of MK. This is a dubious attitude, use of double standards.

- The Council of Europe, PACE know the problem very well. But one must not forget that in 1994 we were able to have cease-fire without the entry of peace forces. This is a unique case... (MK residents, female group).

- OSCE Minsk group takes a pre-Azerbaijani attitude. This structure views Karabagh to be an object of the conflict, that is, it believes the war is for Karabagh and not with Karabagh (students, male group).

- OSCE is between us as a shield that prevents the military actions. (MK residents, female group).

During the discussions of the activities of international organization several judgements were made which we believe important to quote:

- They (UN, NATO, OSCE, CE, PACE) can destroy any country. (Doctors, male group).

- It is beneficial for Europe to keep both parties (Armenia and Azerbaijan) dependent on itself (the same group).

- Whatever country is attended to by the UN, NATO, CE, this country will never get on its feet. (Entrepreneurs, male group).

- World Bank gives money to both the terrorists and the antiterrorist coalition and each of the countries at war. As a result, everyone owes money to the WB, and its officials get huge salaries, drive expensive cars. The same is true about other international organizations. (Doctors, male group).

In general, the assessments of respondents with regard to the role of international organizations in the resolution of the Karabagh conflict are presented in **Table 8** (see Appendix).

## **Conclusion**

The conventional division of groups into those who have been in contact with the MK issue on personal level and the so-called "test" groups, the opinions of which were compared to the judgements of the former group did not reveal significant differences in the approaches to the Karabagh conflict in total.

The thematic category "A" (peaceful and military resolutions to the conflict) caused the greatest interest in both refugee groups as well as in the groups of residents of Mountainous Karabagh and Tavush region bordering with Azerbaijan. The residents of Karabagh and Tavush place more significance on the statements of Azerbaijani politicians about the military resolution of the conflict. The vast majority of the respondents in all the groups supported the purely peaceful resolution of the problem.

The discussions on the thematic category "B" (readiness of Armenia for war) revealed the point of view, shared by the majority of the respondents that neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan is ready for military actions. Here much prominence was given to examples related to the social and economic vulnerability of the population, which were related to the moral and political condition of the society.

In thematic category "C" (the readiness for personal participation in the possible military actions) the respondents, mostly displaying their preferences for the peaceful resolution of the conflict, also noted the readiness to fight back aggression if necessary (70% of respondents). Notably, the abstract and theoretic judgments about the lack of patriotism contradict the answers to the personalized question.

In all the groups when discussing thematic category "D" (on compromise and limits of mutual concessions) the discussion participants stressed the problem of future status of MK.

The collective opinion of the respondents was such that the separation of Mountainous Karabagh from Azerbaijan must be considered a solved issue and Azerbaijani party must make this concession. The groups of refugees and entrepreneurs were most active when discussing this aspect of the problem.

The participation of MK representatives in the peace talks is also considered to be a compromise that Azerbaijan could make.

The vast majority of the respondents noted the possibility under certain conditions of returning the territories of "security belt" around Mountainous Karabagh, except Lachin. He issue of compromise was actively discussed in all the groups, especially among the workers, housewives, and doctors.

During the discussion on the role of international organizations in the resolution of Karabagh problem (thematic category "E") the positive role of OSCE Minsk Group and the Council of Europe was noted primarily. The interest to the subject was especially evident in the groups of housewives, MK residents and Tavush region, as well as doctors. At the same time, it should be noted that the discussion of this subject received minimal time in all the groups generally, which is a sign of insufficient awareness of the respondents on the issue.

During the discussions the references of the respondents on media were most generalized: "this was written in the newspapers, announced on TV". Very few direct references to publications and TV programs are made. "Golos Armenii", "Aravot", the program of the Public Television of Armenia "Zinuzh", telling about the everyday life of Armenian army, "Yerevan-Baku. FrontLine" TV bridge on "Prometheus" TV company, "Zerkalo" Baku newspaper, the stories of which are reprinted in Armenian press this are most often referred to. All the groups believe the Karabagh issue is not of utmost importance for media. The female groups noted that if there were a choice between a TV series and a program on MK problem, the preference would be given to the series.

## Appendix

**Table 1** (in % of the total number of respondents)

Gender	F. Gr.		Survey	
	Fem.	Male	Fem.	Male
	49.7	50.3	48.7	51.3

Age	F. Gr.	Survey
18-24	28.3	16.3
25-40	22.7	36.7
41-55	29	32.2
56 and more	20	15.4

Education		
Incomplete secondary	8.3	3.9
Sec., secondary vocational	33.1	38.8
Higher	58.6	58.6

Social standing		
Employed by state and non-state structures	54.5	61.1
Unemployed	31.8	28.7
Students	13.7	10.2

<b>Well-being</b>	
Very good	8
Good	10.8
Average	39.3
Less than average	26.2
Bad	15.7

**Note:** The welfare in the focus groups is determined by self-assessments and for this reason is not comparable with the methodology of determining the average monthly per capita revenues of households.

**Table 2**

(in percentages from the total number of judgments)

Peaceful and military resolutions to the conflict	12,7
Readiness of Armenia for a war	25,5
Readiness for personal participation in military actions	8,7
About compromise and mutual concessions	40,2
The role of international organizations in the resolution	12,9

**Table 3**

(in percentages from the total number of judgments):

For peaceful resolution	70.1
For military if induced	25.2
For purely military	4.7

**Table 4**

(in percentages from the total number of judgments):

Affirmative judgments	24.2
Negative judgments	67.7
Indefinite judgments	8.1

**Table 5**

Affirmative judgments	21
Negative judgments	34.3
Indefinite judgments	44.7

**Table 6**

(in percentages from the total number of judgments):

Affirmative judgments, first person	57,3
Affirmative judgments, generalized	21,7
Negative judgments	21

**Table 7**

**Note:** the issues of exchanging Meghri for Lachin were considered in complex, 100% is the sum of the first two lines; the data of the third line were calculated considering the 9.3% made by extremely negative judgments.

(In percentages from the total number of judgments):

Territories in exchange for sovereignty	For	Against
Meghri	4	42.8
Lachin	3.2	50
Territories occupied around MK, except Lachin	47.9	42.8

9.3% of judgments on the subject express a strictly negative attitude towards the return of any territories to Azerbaijan.

**Table 8**

(In percentages from the total number of judgments):

Affirmative judgments	61
Negative judgments	15.6
Balanced	23.4

## FOCUS-GROUP DISCUSSIONS

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### THE MOUNTAINOUS KARABAGH CONFLICT: REPORT FROM THE STEPANAKERT SESSIONS

#### Introduction

This report has been developed by Thomas Patrick Carson, Ph.D.\* on the basis of focus group discussions, held in Stepanakert on June 15, 2002. The participants were recruited by Stepanakert Press Club from governmental agencies and local organizations. Some participants were recruited from the street prior to the sessions. The author followed the discussions in another room via simultaneous translation. This translation was typed out verbatim, to the best of ability.\*\*

The Yerevan moderator responsible for the Armenian research led the two group sessions. Discussion followed the joint guide worked out for all the sessions (described in the parallel reports of the partners).

Sessions, divided between females and males, represented a range of ages and occupational statuses. Most had received some higher education, if not completing this. Half of the men reported they were without work.

**Table 1**

**Characteristics of the Participants, Stepanakert Sessions, June 15<sup>th</sup> 2002**

		Age				
		18 - 24	25 - 40	41 - 55	56+	
Female (10)		2	3	3	2	
Male (10)		2	3	2	3	
		Education				
			< secondary	secondary***	higher	
Female			0	2	8	
Male			0	1	9	
		Work Status				
			student	unemployed	employed	
Female			1	0	9	
Male			1	5	4	
		Material well being (self assessment)				
		bad	below average	average	good	very good
Female		0	3	5	1	1
Male		0	4	6	0	0

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\*Thomas Patrick Carson, Ph.D., an independent research consultant, assisted with this project on contract from OSI Network Media Program, Budapest Hungary. The opinions stated in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the OSI Network Media Program, or the Yerevan or Baku Press Clubs. This report has been edited to meet space requirements. The complete version is available at [www.tcgroup-ltd.com](http://www.tcgroup-ltd.com).

\*\*The transcribed translation was later reviewed against the tapes to bring it as near the original as possible. However, full transcriptions were not made from the tapes. For this reason, the quotations used in this report paraphrase the original comments, rather than replicate them exactly.

\*\*\*Secondary plus vocational training.

## Major Themes discussed in the group sessions

The discussion guide set the topics of the sessions. Participants raised additional points in discussion. The major topics covered in the sessions are discussed separately below.

Unification with Armenia and independence are the options for the future of MK for these participants. Arrangements that would leave the area under Azeri control were not considered. This brought the discussion to the possibilities for compromise with Azerbaijan.

### ***Q. What are the options for compromise?***

On this topic, the opinions of participants divided. Several people did suggest that some negotiation, or compromise, is possible. These arguments took different forms:

**\* *Compromise is necessary because wars do not bring solutions, only political agreements do.*** Women expressed these views more often than men.

*Governments should realize that wars have no purpose; that they end up around a table.*

*Our policy should be for a peaceful solution, not a war. History shows that any solution comes from peaceful solutions. The presidents know this. Negotiations will not bring any results without compromise.* - MK women

**\* *Compromise may be possible with the Azeris because they can be reasonable people.*** Participants that expressed these views referred to their personal experience with Azeris. Some gave examples of Azeris they knew who were 'understanding' of the Armenian position and commitment to keeping the land. Another believed that the mothers of boys that would fight in any war could come together in common understanding and find solutions. They believed that the people of Azerbaijan might hold different attitudes than positions taken by the government itself.

*Not all Azeris are bad people. I have worked with them. We have many Azeri officials here . . . for 70 years Azeris have been with us. . . In any case I think that the question is not positioned right. What does that mean to give back the lands to Azerbaijan? It is wrong that there should not be two separate states on this territory.* - MK man

*In time, Azerbaijan will recognize MK will need to be independent. They may think to solve this in a military way, but they will know Armenia will not give it up. I believe this will be solved in a political way. Azeris and Armenians do not want to fight. The prerequisite is that MK is separated from Azerbaijan. This is already the fact.* - MK woman

**\* *Compromise may be based on exchange of land.*** This opinion was offered in the discussion without much support from the group.

**On the other hand, more people believed that no compromise is possible. Underlying reasons for this belief include:**

**\* *Too many lives have been lost to give up what has been gained through war.*** This opinion was the most frequently argued point among both men and women. The argument here is that too many people died for any compromise to be made. (One person even commented that the Azeris lost too many people for them to compromise as well.)

While both men and women argued this position, the women seemed to be stronger on this point. As pointed out in later discussions, those who were the most adamant on this line had already lost sons or husbands. The feeling here was that this loss is too much to ignore, and one cannot make compromises with the enemy they gave their life fighting against.

*We have taken this land with blood and we will fight for it.*

*Azeris should not demand this land. We have given so much blood for this land.*

*I have seen the war and I lost a son, but we will not compromise.* - MK women

**\* *Why should we compromise when we are in the stronger position due to gains of the war?*** The main theme of these opinions is that the Armenians in MK have won the war, and therefore have little reason to negotiate. The implication here is that any negotiation or compromise would require giving up something they have already gained by war, and that



only war can take this back from them. The further implication is that they do not see any area in which they could gain by compromising, or that any compromise they might make would not be worth what is given up to reach agreement.

*After a war is considered, no compromise should be considered. We have taken territories that allow us to keep our territory safe. There is no return . . . I cannot imagine any compromise. If Azerbaijan has some problems, they should be solved through military means. We are ready for this. -MK man*

**\* This is our land historically and we cannot give it up.** Claims to a legitimate right to the land of MK took two forms. The main claim was that blood had been given to keep this land. This is discussed above. Others made a claim to the land on historical grounds. This argument was that MK has always been Armenian.

*Our government is now saying that MK has never been a part of Azerbaijan. Everyone knows that. Why do historians not talk about this, about former borders of Armenia and the matter of how MK was joined with Azerbaijan? Why are they silent now. - MK woman*

**\* Compromise is not possible because Azeris will never give up the land.** Several expressed their belief that Azeris would never be willing to make the types of concessions necessary for any solution acceptable to Armenians in MK.

***Q. If there is a military conflict, is Armenia ready to participate? Are you ready to fight or send someone from your family?***

All are prepared to fight if necessary, but many do not want this. Some believe a conflict is inevitable and no solution is possible without a final conflict. Most think that the international community will not permit this to happen, or that Azerbaijan would not be willing to fight.

*We will never be indifferent if the conflict starts. Azerbaijan will never start the war; they had more losses. They will not start it; they will try to solve this peacefully.*

*The question that whether Azerbaijan would start a military campaign should not bother anyone. For many years we have been independent and they didn't start a war. - MK men*

*The government, no matter how much they negotiate will not solve the problem. They will have no results. We have already solved our problems in the war. What if they want to start it again? They are not strong enough . . . - MK woman*

However, some participants point out that time works to the advantage of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan enjoys both an economic advantage and a larger population. With time, these advantages will give Azerbaijan a bigger, better equipped military than the MK Armenians can expect on their own. The interests of international powers, such as the United States, will work against the Armenian position as well, in people's opinions.

Many also comment on the morale of the two countries.

*In Armenia there is an organization of soldiers. There are many other organizations. The problem is that each of the organizations is prepared to fight against each other. In Armenia there are many political parties that are enemies to each other. They may be united if there is danger to each other. They are doing this. We have not united, but vice versa we are getting more internal problems. That is why we have lost some regions. We have many religious sects. Instead of united people under one church we have many demotions.*

*The same thing is also in Azerbaijan. Several ministers had attempts on them. It is wrong to say our spirit is not ready. They are in the same state. -MK men*

***Q. What is the role of International Organizations?***

Opinions are evenly divided among group participants regarding the role of international organizations and third countries to this conflict. Some hold positive attitudes toward the work of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. OSCE is mentioned as the important organization working on resolving the conflict. Without OSCE, other

organizations would have to start over again from the beginning. Few participants, however, have strong faith in the ability of the international community to bring forward a resolution to this conflict. The most useful contribution international involvement brings is a guarantee that war will not break out again. Many believe the international community will not allow this to happen.

Positive evaluations of the work done by the international community are limited in range and extent. And, positive evaluations are more than offset by the negative comments made by many group members. For some, the international community applies different standards to this region than they do their own countries. There are disagreements between European states that are left unsolved. By drawing much attention to the standoff between MK and Azerbaijan, the international community propagates and expands the MK problem. If left alone by their governments and the international community, some argue, honest citizens of both MK and Azerbaijan could solve this problem. When the international community becomes involved, war and conflict result.

Others claim they are unaware of what the international community does. They say they have solutions, and that they make progress, but the participants do not see the positive results of this. They have done little to help solve the problems of prisoners of war, an example brought up in the women's session. A subtly expressed belief exists that the members on these international commissions financially benefit from extended negotiations that achieve no results.

Regardless of criticism, many do believe it is important to have other countries involved. The important players are Russia (in first place), USA and France was mentioned.

However, a recurring theme in these sessions is that MK participation is important. Direct talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, without representation from MK, do not guarantee that the interests of the Armenians in MK are taken into account. Without direct participation of MK, the process of resolution is prolonged. Another claimed that MK must be officially accepted as an equal partner. (This may be related to a desire for official recognition of the independent status of MK.) Another participant pointed out that MK delegation always participates and that OSCE already acknowledges that MK is a part of the conflict and resolution.

## **Implications**

Key findings are from the discussion sessions in Stepanakert are:

\* Military versus negotiated solution. *The groups are divided between those who believe that only a military solution is possible, and those who believe that only a political solution is possible. Ready to fight if necessary, most would prefer a peaceful solution. This may be particularly true with the younger participants who would be on the front lines in any outbreak of conflict.*

\* Compromise with Azerbaijan. *There is a wide range of opinions about Azeris voiced in these group sessions. Some believe they can reach agreement with Azeris; others do not. The pervasive belief that the cost in human lives, given to bring MK to its current status, is too great a debt to allow for concessions to be made needs to be considered in the negotiation process.*

\* The role of Armenia in resolving the conflict. *Most people strongly identify with Armenia and look for its support and perhaps leadership in resolving this conflict. However, there is also an opinion that Armenia is too much in control of the negotiation process and that Mountainous Karabagh plays a secondary role. Some participants stated an opinion that they felt left out of the process, and that too much attention is placed on bilateral discussions between Armenia and Azerbaijan.*

\* Positive versus negative evaluations of the role of the international community. *Many believe that the OSCE and other international organizations play an important role. However, many are also critical and distrust these organizations. Most (but not all) believe*

*that the involvement of the international community does prevent war from breaking out again in the region. However, most remain to be convinced that the international community achieves more than this. People expect the international bodies to seek their own interests (whether national, institutional or personal). Those interests will differ from theirs. They look less to the United States (which will be oriented to oil interests) than to Russia as a positive mediator in the negotiation process.*

## MONITORING OF AZERBAIJANI MEDIA

### **QARABAG CONFLICT AND PROSPECTS OF ITS RESOLUTION**

Azerbaijani media monitoring on the problem of “The Qarabag conflict and settlement prospects” was carried out from April 1 to 31, 2002.

The monitoring targeted all publications in five daily newspapers and television materials shown in the news bulletins of Azerbaijan's two television companies that directly or indirectly pertained to the problem of the Qarabag conflict.

The following media outlets playing the most noticeable role in Azerbaijan information market were selected for the monitoring:

“**AzTV-1**” - The first channel of the state television company founded in 1956. It broadcasts 16-18 hours a day and its programs are viewed throughout Azerbaijan. Over the studied period, the main news programs, Xabarlar (Monday-Saturday 2000-2040), Pulse of the Day (Monday-Saturday 2040-2100) and Week (Sunday 2000-2105), have broadcast 2,638 programs, including 293 (146 fully and 147 partly) dedicated to the Upper Qarabag problem. This constitutes 11.1 per cent of all the programs by the mentioned television channel.

“**ANS**” - The first private television and radio company of the country broadcasting since 1992. It broadcasts 16-18 hours a day and its programs cover more than 80 per cent of Azerbaijan's territory. Over the studied period, the main news programs, Xabarci (Monday-Saturday 2100-2035), Point of View (Monday-Friday 2135-2200), Last Week (Sunday 2100-2200), ANS has broadcast 1,573 programs, including 371 (270 fully and 101 partly) dedicated to the Upper Qarabag problem. This constitutes 23.6 per cent of all the programs by the mentioned television channel.

“**Xalq Qazeti**” - Government newspaper published by the department for current affairs under the Azerbaijani Presidential Administration. It was founded in 1919 and was published under the name of Communist till 1991. It is published six times a week except Monday in A-2 format and on eight pages. Over the studied period, the circulation ranged from 5,700 to 7,000 copies. The total number of studied programs is 4,317, of which 280 programs (6.5 per cent) were dedicated to the problem, including 89 in full.

“**Yeni Musavat**” - Opposition-minded newspaper founded by the Chairman of the Musavat Party, Isa Qambar, in 1989. It is published seven times a week in A-3 format on 16-24 pages. Over the studied period, the circulation ranged from 9,200 to 15,000 copies. The total number of studied programs is 10,200, of which 596 programs (5.8 per cent) broadcast from April to August 2002 were dedicated to the problem, including 375 in full.

“**Azadliq**” - Opposition-minded newspaper. Founder is Gunduz Tahirli former editor of the newspaper. Founded in 1989. It is published five times a week (Tuesday-Saturday) in A-3 format on 12-16 pages with a circulation of 5,610 copies. The total number of studied programs is 5,384, of which 101 programs (1.9 per cent) were dedicated to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, including 62 in full.

“**Ekho**” - Independent newspaper. Founded by a group of journalists. Founded in

2001. It is published in Russian five times a week: four times (Tuesday-Friday) in A-2 format on 8 pages with a circulation of 6,000 copies and on Saturday in A-3 format on 32 pages in 9,000 copies. The total number of studied programs is 5,824, of which 459 programs (7.9 per cent) were dedicated to the Upper Qarabag problem, including 155 in full.

**“Ayna-Zerkalo”** - Independent newspaper. Founded by a group of journalists. Founded in 1990. It is published in Azeri and Russian five times a week: four times (Tuesday-Friday) in A-2 format on 8 pages with a circulation of 4,500 copies in Russian and on Saturday in A-3 format on 48-56 pages in 8,000 copies. The total number of studied programs is 6,669, of which 141 programs (2.1 per cent) were dedicated to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, including 89 in full.

As is known, a similar monitoring of the Azerbaijani mass media on the Upper Qarabag problem was carried out over six months of last year, from March to August 2002. Therefore, a comparative analysis of their results would be quite interesting. It is worthy of note that all the specialists involved in last year's monitoring were attracted this year as well. To process the great number of figures, Statistica-99 Edition software was applied.

### **The processing methodology included:**


1. Calculating the total number of publications/materials of each newspaper issue/news bulletin except weather forecasts, commercials, television programs, announcements, “clean” photos” (not related to any materials and without captions), crossword puzzles, etc.;
2. Determining the presence extent of the topic: number of newspaper publications/television materials fully or partly dedicated to the Upper Qarabag problem;
3. Determining the content category of each newspaper publication/television material;
4. Determining the attitude towards the content category;
5. Determining the source of information of each newspaper publication/television material;
6. Determining the type of each newspaper publication/television material.

*Note: A television material implies: a separate report in a news program; a separate news report read out by presenter. Television interviews and separate questions and answers about different aspects of the theme (problem) were not divided and were viewed as one item.*

So, let's take a look at the comparative information about the results of the monitoring of the above-mentioned five newspapers and two television channels (see Table 1).


The total number of registered and monitored newspaper publications and television materials was 36,605, of which 6.1 per cent, or 2,241 were dedicated to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict (approximately 450 materials a month; for comparison - last year the total number of materials in six months was 4,280, an average of 710 materials a month). A little over half of these materials, 1,186 (or 52.9 per cent), were fully dedicated to the Upper Qarabag problem and 1,055 (47.1 per cent) partly (see Picture 1).

Initial calculations show that newspapers and television channels raise the theme with almost the same frequency. The five newspapers have carried 1,577 publications (70.4 per cent of the total number), while the two television channels - 644 materials (29.6 per cent). This means that the theme is equally popular with difference audiences (in terms of political preferences, geographic specificity, etc.). however, it has to be indicated as well that while monthly curves of the two television channels almost repeat each other, with the newspapers they often do not coincide. This is probably connected with the fact that television mainly prefers to carry follow-up reports: of 664 television materials registered over this period by monitors only 85 are classified as analytical, which constitutes less than 15 per cent of the total number of television materials. Of 1,577 publications published in newspapers, 803, or more than half, are analytical.




PIC 1

Ways of resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict are touched upon in every single material (Picture 2).



PIC 2


The press and television discuss the negotiated settlement more often. Of 1,977 cases, two thirds are dedicated to this alternative. A negative attitude to a peace settlement is expressed in 9.9 per cent of all cases, while a positive attitude is voiced in 57 per cent. Ways of a military solution to the conflict were mentioned in 660 cases, including 16.2 per cent containing a negative attitude and 47 per cent viewing it positively. Let's recall that during last year's six-month monitoring of the Azerbaijani mass media, the military solution was mentioned a total of 1,130 times, of which 41.3 per cent were in support of it and 8.8 per cent were opposed. The comparison between the 2001 and 2002 monitoring results, as well as the two-fold domination of "peaceful" materials over "military" ones, illustrate that there is no such thing as stepped-up military propaganda in the Azerbaijani mass media. It is indicative that electronic media take a more emotional attitude towards the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict than print media (Picture 3).




PIC 3

Only 2.7 per cent of 375 television materials concerning the negotiated or military solution to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict maintain a neutral tone, while print media preserve "neutrality" in 41.8 per cent of 1,602 cases.

The issue of the status of Upper Qarabag is also central for mass media. This is confirmed by the fact that this theme is second in popularity only to the "war or peace" topic - 1,654 mentions. Such alternative solutions to this issue as independence for Upper Qarabag or its annexation to Armenia were raised in 129 and 66 cases respectively. The analysis shows that these were mainly the cases when mass media quoted Armenian politicians and public figures or gave the floor to their Azerbaijani opponents. Not a single case of a positive attitude to the mentioned options was registered. In 106 of 195 cases when mass media were quoting Armenian sources without providing any commentary, monitors considered the attitude of mass media to the issue as neutral (Picture 4 and 5).




PIC 4



PIC 5

The vast majority of materials in the country's mass media view the Upper Qarabag status issue only from the angle of "UQ within Azerbaijan". A positive assessment of such an option is expressed in 1,358 of 1,451 cases (93.6 per cent). At the same time, the details of such a status are provided extremely rarely.

What is the ultimate format of the negotiating process? Public debate over this flare up and then gradually subside, paving the way to the mass media (Picture 6).




PIC 6



The activity of the OSCE Minsk Group is still the focus of attention (it is touched upon in 537 materials) together with the direct talks between the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents (383 materials). Almost every other material gives a positive assessment to the Minsk Group's work, while a quarter of items give a negative assessment. A similar attitude is expressed to bilateral contacts between the presidents, though negative assessments are not as frequent (18.8 per cent). Judging by the predictions often made in the press, the slow pace and the futility of the MG OSCE efforts, as well as the unproductive meetings of the Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders, will lead to the growth of such criticism, however, over the monitored period such a tendency was not observed.

However, there is something that can be seen as the first indicator of this trend: the share materials discussing an alternative format talks brokered by an interested country (317 cases) or an international organization (160 cases) proved to be too high. Among interested countries are often the USA and Turkey, less frequently Russia, while among international organizations the Council of Europe and the UN. A positive assessment to the last two options is given in over 55 per cent of cases, while a negative one only in 16.6 per cent. The number of materials touching upon the possibility of Upper Qarabag taking part in negotiations in any format is much smaller 38 cases (Picture 7).




PIC 7

The possibility of considering the Upper Qarabag problem in international regional organizations is not popular either (97 cases, of which 74.2 per cent giving a positive assessment and 9.3 per cent negative).

The issue of connection between the Upper Qarabag issue and the problem of terrorism has become quite popular with mass media in the wake of the September 11, 2001 developments. For this reason it was included into the monitoring program. The research has shown that the seven monitored media outlets have raised the issue 761 times in five months. Of these, only four spoke about the absence of such a connection, while in 757 cases it was said that such a link does exist.

The monitoring has shown that the attitude of Azerbaijani mass media towards interstate cooperation between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as other bilateral contacts, remains negative (Picture 8).




PIC 8

Of 209 items viewing this aspect of the problem (150 about inter-state cooperation and 59 about bilateral contacts), 68 per cent expressed the same stance: “until the occupied lands are vacated, any cooperation is out of the question, as it would be aimed at strengthening the current situation”. Only in 13 per cent of such materials the tone was neutral. However, there are materials in support of such contacts (18.7 per cent), as authors think that such relations can speed up solution to the problem. At the same time, another fact is worthy of note: while 65.3 per cent of materials were opposed to inter-state Azerbaijani-Armenian contacts, the possibility of bilateral public (non-governmental) contacts caused a more negative reaction (74.6 per cent of cases).

Particularly important from different aspects (from accuracy to the influence on public opinion) is the source of information. Under the circumstances when the process of solution is shrouded in a veil of secrecy, government workers and politicians remain tight-lipped, foreign sources are either difficult to access or of little help due to the lack of interest in this problem, the importance of domestic sources of information becomes exceptional (Picture 9).

This is corroborated by the survey results. In 2,241 items monitors have registered a total of 3,675 sources of information. Only in 24 cases (0.6 per cent of the total number) official documents were used as a source. Foreign sources were used in 397 cases (10.8 per cent). Armenian sources of information were used in 213 cases, which is 5.8 per cent of the total, the Qarabag sources were used in 67 cases (1.8 per cent). These were mainly the statements by Armenian political leaders about the conflict and ways of resolving it and their quotes borrowed from the Armenian press. The rest was the information of a given media outlet (2,104 cases 57.3 per cent), which contained a reference to other Azerbaijani sources, most of which were also media outlets (870 cases 23.7 per cent).

This is the preliminary analysis of the monitoring results in figures and percentage.



PIC 9

**SUMMARY TABLE OF AZERBAIJANI MEDIA MONITORING**  
 (Azerbaijani State TV Company, "ANS" TV and "Xalq Qazeti", "Yeni Musavat", "Azadliq", "Ekho", "Ayna-Zerkalo" newspapers)  
 April, 1 - August, 31, 2002

Subject presence form	CODE	Conflict category	APRIL			MAY			JUNE			JULY			AUGUST			TOTAL					
			Frequency of occurrence	Attitude			Frequency of occurrence	Attitude			Frequency of occurrence	Attitude			Frequency of occurrence	Attitude			Frequency of occurrence	Attitude			
				Positive (+)	Negative (-)	Neutral 0		Positive (+)	Negative (-)	Neutral 0		Positive (+)	Negative (-)	Neutral 0		Positive (+)	Negative (-)	Neutral 0		Positive (+)	Negative (-)	Neutral 0	
Subject presence form	1	Total number of cases	746			739			726			716			704			3616					
	2	Peacefully decided to U.Cause	199			238			262			216			287			1165					
	3	Peacefully decided to U.Cause	29			28			20			22			13			105					
		<b>Total</b>	<b>492</b>			<b>507</b>			<b>482</b>			<b>468</b>			<b>422</b>			<b>2241</b>					
Solutions to the conflict	5	Peace	199	12	11	59	23	15	1	8	29	15	3	13	29	13	12	137	79	13	49		
	6	War	88	59	5	25	104	74	1	21	136	65	2	4	153	55	2	77	177	55	45	76	
		<b>Total</b>	<b>287</b>	<b>184</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>338</b>	<b>232</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>431</b>	<b>223</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>442</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>491</b>	<b>232</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>121</b>	
UQ status	10	UQ as an independent state	9	0	5	4	19	0	1	9	32	0	13	14	22	0	1	31	123	0	61	68	
	11	UQ as part of America	8	0	3	5	19	0	12	7	6	0	2	4	5	0	2	3	28	0	10	18	
	12	UQ as part of Azerbaijan	29	26	4	10	39	30	9	6	29	29	13	6	29	25	9	6	318	278	25	4	149
	13	Any other option	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	3	0	3	0	2	1	0	1	2	1	0	1	8
		<b>Total</b>	<b>276</b>	<b>265</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>338</b>	<b>315</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>324</b>	<b>294</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>311</b>	<b>288</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>365</b>	<b>279</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>55</b>	
Negotiation format	20	Direct bilateral negotiations America/Azerbaijan	33	15	2	16	99	44	17	33	130	41	33	51	36	16	4	16	86	55	10	19	
	21	Direct bilateral negotiations America/Azerbaijan-UQ	9	2	2	5	7	1	3	3	6	0	3	3	2	1	0	1	3	1	1	1	
	22	Direct negotiations EU/OSPAR/OSCE	0	0	0	0	4	1	1	2	4	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	3	1	2	0	
	23	Negotiations mediated by international court(s)	6	3	7	16	9	5	2	2	7	3	1	2	2	1	4	8	5	4	12	8	
	24	Negotiations mediated by international organization(s)	5	2	6	21	2	12	2	7	3	2	5	13	2	13	8	7	2	12	1	7	
	25	Negotiations under the OSCE Minsk Group	10	4	29	23	110	62	2	25	167	65	4	5	64	31	11	22	99	55	21	17	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>338</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>422</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>52</b>		
Whether the conflict and terrorism problem	30	Consideration of UQ issue in international (regional) structures	23	13	5	7	8	5	2	1	19	13	1	2	23	18	0	5	22	21	1	1	
	40	Raised	12				17				13				15								
	41	Not raised	4				0				0				0								
	<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>				<b>17</b>				<b>13</b>				<b>15</b>									
Information source	50	Media titles to the possibility of American-Azerbaijan interstate cooperation in different areas while the Garabag conflict is resolved	3	9	2	8	5	15	3	5	23	0	2	3	19	4	11	4	14	3	10	1	
	60	Media titles to the role of American-Azerbaijan contacts and the eradication of various (non-governmental) organizations while the Garabag conflict is resolved	2	3	2	2	3	5	22	3	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	
Type of material	70	Own sources	41				48				43				33								
	71	Other Azerbaijani sources	13				19				16				19								
	72	American sources	2				3				6				5								
	73	Garabag sources	7				15				28				4								
	74	Foreign sources	64				79				80				78								
	75	Official sources	6				2				2				4								
	<b>Total</b>	<b>68</b>				<b>83</b>				<b>70</b>				<b>76</b>									
80	Event oriented (news)	25				34				24				22									
81	Analytic	13				17				16				19									
	<b>Total</b>	<b>42</b>				<b>51</b>				<b>42</b>				<b>41</b>									

## MONITORING OF ARMENIAN MEDIA

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### KARABAGH CONFLICT AND PROSPECTS OF ITS RESOLUTION

Monitoring of Armenian media "Karabagh Conflict and Prospects of Its Resolution" was conducted during five months, from March 1 till July 31, 2002.

The targets of the monitoring were two TV channels, the broadcast area of which covers the whole country (the Public Television of Armenia, PTA, and "Prometheus" TV company), and five national newspapers.

**"Prometheus"**: a private TV company, founded in 1998 by "ZakNefteGazStroy-Prometheus" open joint-stock company. The air time periodicity is 15 hours daily. The main newscast of the TV company, "Lraber", was studied. "Lraber" is aired five times a day on week days, and four times a day on Saturdays. The issues at 20.00 were monitored, their total number making 131. Within the monitoring period a total of 1,968 pieces was studied. Of these, 250 pieces were devoted to the problem of Mountainous Karabagh - 176 being fully devoted to the issue, and 74 containing a mentioning of it.

**Public Television of Armenia**: public TV company, founded in 2001 by "Public Television and Radio Company" state enterprise. The air time periodicity is 16 hours daily. The TV company is managed by the Council of the Public TV and Radio Company. The PTA newscast "Hailur" as well as "Agenda" information and analysis program were monitored. "Hailur" is aired seven times a day on week days and four times a day on Saturdays. "Agenda" is aired once a day on Sundays at 22.00. "Hailur" issues at 21.00 were monitored. During the study period 130 issues of "Hailur" and 18 issues of "Agenda" were aired. Within the monitoring period a total of 2,063 pieces was studied. Of these, 208 pieces were devoted to the problem of Mountainous Karabagh - 143 being fully devoted to the issue and 65 containing a mentioning of it.

**"Aravot"**: daily (issued five times a week), founded in 1994 by the Editorial Board of "Aravot". The standard volume is 8/A3 pp., the claimed circulation is 5,000 copies. During the monitoring period 105 issues were published, 16 of them having been published in 12/A3 pp., and 8 - in 20/A3 pp. Within the monitoring period a total of 3,469 publications was studied. Of these, 121 publications were devoted to the problem of Mountainous Karabagh - 66 being fully devoted to the issue and 55 containing a mentioning of it. The daily closed for vacation on July 28.

**"Azg"**: daily (issued five times a week), founded in 1991 by the Council of Founders. The volume is 12/A3 pp., the claimed circulation is 3,000 copies. During the monitoring period 104 issues were published. Within the monitoring period a total of 4,059 publications was studied. Of these, 197 publications were devoted to the problem of Mountainous Karabagh - 102 being fully devoted to the issue and 95 containing a mentioning of it.

**"Golos Armenii"**: newspaper (issued three times a week), founded in 1991 by the editorial staff. The volume is 8/A2 pp., the claimed circulation is 3,500 copies. During the monitoring period 63 issues were published. Within the monitoring period a total of 3,712 publications was studied. Of these, 468 publications were devoted to the problem of

Mountainous Karabagh - 226 being fully devoted to the issue, and 242 containing a mentioning of it.

**“Haikakan Zhamanak”**: daily (issued five times a week), founded in 1997 by “Dareskizb” LLC. The standard volume is 8/A3 pp., the claimed circulation is 3,500 copies. During the monitoring period 96 issues were published, 19 of them having been published in 12/A3 pp. Within the monitoring period a total of 2,998 publications was studied. Of these, 161 publications were devoted to the problem of Mountainous Karabagh - 97 being fully devoted to the issue and 64 containing a mentioning of it. The daily closed for vacation on July 21.

**“Hayots Ashkhar”**: daily (issued five times a week), founded in 1997 by a natural person. The standard volume is 8/A3 pp., the claimed circulation is 3,500 copies. During the monitoring period 106 issues were published, 7 of them having been published in 12/A3 pp., and 17 - in 16/A3 pp. Within the monitoring period a total of 3,915 publications was studied. Of these, 315 publications were devoted to the problem of Mountainous Karabagh - 170 being fully devoted to the issue and 145 containing a mentioning of it.

The primary issues of the main newscasts were monitored on the TV channels. On Public Television of Armenia the issue of "Hailur" newscast at 21.00 as well as the Sunday information and analysis program "Agenda" were monitored. On "Prometheus" TV company the newscast of "Lraber" at 20.00 was studied. A total of 4,031 pieces was monitored. Of these, 458 pieces (making about 11.3% of the total number of pieces) were devoted to the problem of Mountainous Karabagh: 319 (69.7%) - fully, and 139 (30.3%) - partially.

During the newspaper monitoring a total of 18,153 publications was studied. Of these, 1,262 publications (6.9% of the total number of pieces) were devoted to the problem of Mountainous Karabagh: 661 (52.4%) - fully, and 601 (47.6%) - partially.

In total, during the monitoring 22,184 pieces of print and broadcast media were studied, of which 1,720 (7.7% of the total number) were devoted to the problem of Mountainous Karabagh: 980 (57%) - fully, and 740 (43%) - partially.

By percentages for each of the media studied it is obvious that MK problem was paid most attention to by "Prometheus" TV company (12.7% of the total number of pieces) and "Golos Armenii" newspaper (12.6%). These are followed by PTA (10.1%), "Hayots Ashkhar" (8%), “Haikakan Zhamanak” (5.3%), “Azg” (4.8%) and “Aravot” (3.5%) newspapers.

The start of the monitoring coincided with the activation of the negotiation process which occurred subsequently to a year's stagnation, caused by the failure of the dialogue on the supreme level after the meeting of the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Key West. Starting from mid-February the officials informed about the change in the format of the talks, the preparations for the meeting of personal representatives of the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan and made their comments. The newspapers and the television responded to the meetings of the Armenian President Robert Kocharian and the head of Mountainous Karabagh Arkady Ghukasian with the acting OSCE chairman, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal Jaime Gama, who visited Yerevan, published the statement of the co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group Rudolph Perina (USA): “I know that Mountainous Karabagh has never been a part of independent Azerbaijan.” Communications about the press-conference in Baku, during which Heydar Aliiev informed the press that he was introduced to the new proposals on Karabagh resolution, which are not continuing the Paris or Key West principles, were published. This is the information background of the pieces published in March.

The monthly distribution of pieces as shown below (*Table 1*) signifies the higher interest to the MK problem in March than during the subsequent months (*below the percentages of the total number of pieces in the month are presented*):

*Table 1*

<b>MEDIA</b>	<b>March</b>	<b>April</b>	<b>May</b>	<b>June</b>	<b>July</b>
“Prometheus”	16.4	10.5	11.9	15.5	9.3
PTA	14.2	6.4	11.6	11.1	6.9
“Aravot”	4.2	1.9	2.4	3.8	5.3
“Azg”	5.4	4.1	5	4.5	5.1
“Golos Armenii”	17.4	10.4	14.4	11.5	10
“Haikakan Zhamanak”	5	3.4	5.6	5.7	7.9
“Hayots Ashkhar”	9.3	6	7.3	8.8	8.8

The most significant event, leading to the upsurge of interest to Karabagh problem, was the closed hearings in the Parliament of Armenia. The deputies of the National Assembly were discussing the issue of "The situation in the region and the danger of its negative impact on the Karabagh conflict". The materials of the closed hearings were not publicized, however the press presented the interviews of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministers of the country, who placed the emphasis on the impossibility of territory exchange. It should be noted that the work under the lack of official information (during the monitoring not a single official document appeared in the media) enabled the opposition to use rumors, versions on the MK problem in the inner political debate. The media addressed the option of "corridor for corridor" again, which is especially actively explored by the opposition. This subject is presented among the political accusations of the leaders of the country and appears most often in the print media. The press has no access to the negotiations process, and for this reason only the official information about the meetings of personal representatives of the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan (in Prague), the preparations for the meetings of the Presidents with no date specification was published. Another subject for discussion is the "package" and "stage-by-stage" resolution. The question of MK involvement in the negotiations is explored as well.

The specifics of the Armenian approach to Karabagh resolution were made public by the speech of Robert Kocharian at "Armenia-Diaspora" forum: "We advocate the peaceful resolution of the problem at the negotiation table. We think the involvement of the MKR in the negotiations indispensable. We acknowledge the right of MKR to self-determination and self-defense. We are responsible for the security of the MKR population. MKR has never been a part of independent Azerbaijan and was formed as a result of Soviet Union collapse. Thus, it is wrong to speak about the violation of territorial integrity of any country, apart from the Soviet Union, in this regard. We are ready to discuss the resolution in a legal dimension." (*Quotation taken from "Golos Armenii" newspaper, May 28, 2002.*)

To a certain extent the media explore these principles, interpreting them according to their political attitudes. The general trends present in the newspaper and TV stories can be defined. Opinions are published that the 20 meetings of the Presidents proved futile, the meetings of Deputy Foreign Ministers are criticized for their format, the policy of the third countries (international community) with regard to MK issue, directed only at the maintenance of peace and stability in the region and not at the solution of the problem as such, is noted. The fact that the negotiations do not yield the expected results is linked to the interest of the countries, co-chairing in the Minsk Group, in the region, at the same time their role in peace maintenance is praised.

Below (*Table 2*) the data on the format of negotiations process as well as on the consideration of MK issue in international (regional) structures (*herein percentages from the total number of pieces on Karabagh problem are presented*):

**Table 2**

<b>Negotiation Format</b>	<b>Prometheus</b>	<b>PTA</b>	<b>Aravot</b>	<b>Azg</b>	<b>Golos Armenii</b>	<b>Haikakan Zhamanak</b>	<b>Hayots Ashkhar</b>
Direct bilateral negotiations Armenia-Azerbaijan	21.2	21.6	9.1	8.1	12	6.2	7.6
Direct trilateral negotiations Armenia-Azerbaijan-MK	2.4	3.4	5	4.1	3.6	8.1	2.5
Direct negotiations Baku-Stepanakert	0	0	0.8	0	0.6	0	0
Negotiations mediated by an interested country(ies)	6.4	4.3	6.6	13.2	7.1	6.2	7.9
Negotiations mediated by an international organization(s)	1.2	1.9	1.7	0	2.1	0	0
Negotiations under the OSCE Minsk Group	27.6	26.9	25.6	32	15.2	33.5	32.7
Consideration of MK issue in international (regional) structures	0.8	1.9	6.6	9.6	1.7	5.6	9.8

The monthly distribution of materials on the format of negotiations process is as follows (Table 3):

**Table 3**

	<b>Negotiation Format</b>	<b>March</b>	<b>April</b>	<b>May</b>	<b>June</b>	<b>July</b>
<b>TV</b>	Direct bilateral negotiations Armenia-Azerbaijan	14.9	15.1	33	20.2	26.7
	Direct trilateral negotiations Armenia-Azerbaijan-MK	3.7	0	2.1	5.3	1.7
	Direct negotiations Baku-Stepanakert	0	0	0	0	0
	Negotiations mediated by an interested country(ies)	3.7	5.5	12.4	3.2	1.7
	Negotiations mediated by an international organization(s)	3	2.7	0	1.1	0
	Negotiations under the OSCE Minsk Group	41	34.2	10.3	25.5	18.3
	Consideration of MK issue in international (regional) structures	4.5	0	0	0	0
<b>Newspapers</b>	Direct bilateral negotiations Armenia-Azerbaijan	7.9	6.3	11.7	10.9	9.1
	Direct trilateral negotiations Armenia-Azerbaijan-MK	5.3	1.6	3.9	4.7	4.3
	Direct negotiations Baku-Stepanakert	0.7	0.5	0	0.4	0
	Negotiations mediated by an interested country(ies)	5.6	12	7.4	11.2	5.5
	Negotiations mediated by an international organization(s)	2.3	1.6	0	0	0.8
	Negotiations under the OSCE Minsk Group	26.5	26.2	19.8	33.3	21.7
	Consideration of MK issue in international (regional) structures	8.3	0	7.4	3.9	8.3



As it can be seen from the Tables above, the pieces studied are mostly devoted to the negotiations under OSCE Minsk Group. Its role in the conflict resolution is generally positively viewed. Attention is paid to negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as to the consideration of the conflict resolution by international structures. As the results of the previous monitoring showed, too, the media discuss the possibilities of third countries joining the negotiations process - Iran, Turkey (the possible involvement of the latter continues to be regarded mostly negatively). The findings confirm the results of the previous monitoring with regard to rather unpopular option of direct negotiations Baku-Stepanakert, too, yet the option of trilateral negotiations Armenia-Azerbaijan-MK is still explored.

The media discuss the status of Mountainous Karabagh (*Table 4*). As the results of the previous monitoring show, media mostly imagine the future of Mountainous Karabagh as that of an independent state (8.3% of the total number of pieces on MK issues). The option of "MK as a part of Armenia" continues to be considered. The subject of "MK as a part of Azerbaijan" mostly appears in press in quotations or reprints from Azerbaijani sources. At the same time, as the data of this monitoring reveal, unlike the TV channels, the newspapers, the specifics of which prompts greater focus on analysis as compared to the TV, actively explore other options for the MK status (10.4% and 0.4% of the total number of pieces on Karabagh problem, respectively). In particular, the subject of MK joining Russia, CIS or its being under the jurisdiction of various countries and international organizations were considered.

**Table 4**

Status of Mountainous Karabagh	Prometheus	PTA	Aravot	Azg	Golos Armenii	Haikakan Zhamanak	Hayots Ashkhar
MK as an independent state	7.6	13.9	10.7	8.1	6.2	9.3	7
MK as a part of Armenia	2.4	1.9	6.6	3.6	0.6	6.2	4.4
MK as a part of Azerbaijan	5.2	2.4	12.4	5.6	4.1	7.5	6.7
Any other option	0.4	0.5	28.9	13.2	0	19.9	12.1

Due to the increasing importance of the problem of international terrorism, the issue of correlation between the Karabagh conflict and the terrorism was considered. This issue was touched upon in few cases (0.6% of the total number of pieces on MK problem).

The prospects of the interstate cooperation between Armenia and Azerbaijan in various spheres with conflict remaining unresolved were little explored: 1.1% - on TV channels and 1.8% - in newspapers. The media did not address the issue of bilateral Armenian-Azerbaijani contacts and the interaction of various (non-governmental) organizations with conflict being unresolved: this subject was never addressed on the air, and the press devoted to it only 0.6% of the publications on MK issue.

The publication from "Press Club" regional bulletin "Conflicts in South Caucasus: Search for a Compromise", reprinted by "Golos Armenii" newspaper (May 23, 2002), is noteworthy. The article presents the findings of surveys, conducted in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia under "South Caucasus Network for Civil Accord", supported by the European Commission. One of the conclusions made by the researchers was that the people of conflicting parties do not want a war and prefer the peaceful resolution. This idea is supported by both the findings of the monitoring and the focus group research conducted under this project. Like before (monitoring of 2001), the media continue to advocate the peaceful resolution of the MK issue.

The last statement is illustrated by the Tables below (5, 6) where the data on the exploration of the peace/war subjects is presented, both by medium and by month:

Table 5





Table 6



Continuing the trend, revealed by the previous monitoring, the TV channels and newspapers primarily publish their own pieces on MK issue, as well as use the information of other Armenian media. The share of Karabagh sources remains quite insignificant. This can be explained by the fact that the leading Armenian media have their own channels to receive information from Karabagh directly. At the same time, while by the data of previous monitoring the media relied on foreign sources a bit more than on Azerbaijani ones, now the picture is reverse: the share of Azerbaijani sources somewhat exceeds that of foreign media (TV - 1.7% and 1.3%, newspapers - 2.2% and 1.6%, respectively).

Tables below (7, 8) present the general picture of information source reliance (by medium and by month):

**Table 7**


Information Sources	Prometheus	PTA	Aravot	Azg	Golos Armenii	Haikakan Zhamanak	Hayots Ashkhar
Own sources	94	95.7	85.1	60.1	74.1	79.5	60.6
Other Armenian sources	3.6	0.5	14.9	36.5	21.8	16.8	38.4
Azerbaijani sources	1.2	2.4	0	6.1	1.9	4.3	0
Karabagh sources	0	0	0	0.5	0.9	0.6	0
Foreign sources	1.2	1.4	0	4.1	1.3	1.2	1.3
Official documents	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

**Table 8**


Information Sources	March		April		May		June		July	
	TV	Newsp	TV	Newsp	TV	Newsp	TV	Newsp	TV	Newsp
Own sources	93.3	70.9	91.8	70.2	95.9	68.5	94.7	64.7	100	78
Other Armenian sources	2.2	23.8	5.5	26.7	2.1	29.2	1.1	35.7	0	19.7
Azerbaijani sources	1.5	1.7	0	2.6	2.1	2.3	4.3	1.2	0	3.5
Karabagh sources	0	1.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.4
Foreign sources	3	2	2.7	1.6	0	2.7	0	0.8	0	0.8
Official documents	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

The proportion of event-oriented and analytic information in the media (*Tables 9, 10*) is as follows (by medium and by month):

**Table 9**



**Table 10**



As before, the event-oriented, non-commented information prevails on TV, while newspapers give more space to analytic pieces.

In June and July the press continued to make comments on the well-known interview of the AR President Heydar Aliev to the Azerbaijani media. In one of his speeches the RA President Robert Kocharian qualified the interview as an attempt to influence the inner political situation in Armenia. The reason for this long-distance "duel" of the Presidents was the question of the territory exchange. As it was noted, it is one of the most sensitive issues of those related to MK problem.

The media raise the question of whether it is necessary to publicize the negotiation records, however, the official Yerevan announces its commitment to the principle of confidentiality of the negotiations process. This policy resulted in the fact that, as it was mentioned before, no information channel in Armenia published official documents or quotations from them.

The analysis of the attitudes towards the thematic categories of content allows to define a hypothesis that needs further testing: when adopting the methods and approaches of new democratic journalism, the Armenian media avoid giving evaluation of their own. The media pieces are mostly balanced. The comments and criticism are made by logical argumentation without lexical and emotional evaluations.

During the previous monitoring the reticence of Armenian media in the pieces quoting and commenting on the viewpoints from Azerbaijani information sources was noted. The same trend continues in the analysis of the present monitoring data. Mainly, reprints from Azerbaijani, Russian or foreign media dominate (Azerbaijani "Zerkalo" and "Echo" dailies, Russian "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" daily, "Turkish Daily News", etc.), as well as numerous quotations in the analytic pieces and comments. During the use of Azerbaijani information sources negative lexical and emotional evaluation are seldom published, too.

**SUMMARY TABLE OF ARMENIAN MEDIA MONITORING**  
**(“PROMETHEUS” TV COMPANY, PUBLIC TELEVISION OF ARMENIA, “ARAVOT”, “AZG”,**  
**“GOLOS ARMENII”, “HAIKAKAN ZHAMANAK”, “HAYOTS ASHKHAR” NEWSPAPERS)**  
**March 1 - July 31, 2002**

Content category	MARCH			APRIL			MAY			JUNE			JULY			TOTAL								
	Frequency of occurrence	Attitude		Frequency of occurrence	Attitude		Frequency of occurrence	Attitude		Frequency of occurrence	Attitude		Frequency of occurrence	Attitude		Frequency of occurrence	Attitude							
		Positive	Negative		Neutral	Positive		Negative	Neutral		Positive	Negative		Neutral	Positive		Negative	Neutral	Positive	Negative	Neutral			
<b>Subject presence form</b>																								
Total number of pieces	4560		0	4452		0	4568		0	4416		4188		0	22184		0							
Pieces fully devoted to MK issue	254			141			172			226		187			980									
Pieces partially devoted to MK issue	182			123			182			126		127			740									
<b>Total</b>	<b>436</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>264</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>354</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>352</b>		<b>314</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>1720</b>		<b>0</b>							
<b>Solutions to the conflict</b>																								
Peace	189	127	8	54	81	23	2	56	101	29	0	72	89	26	1	62	84	37	0	47	544	242	11	291
War	19	6	8	5	17	3	3	11	14	1	0	13	13	0	4	9	76	14	15	47				
<b>Total</b>	<b>208</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>620</b>	<b>256</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>338</b>
<b>MK status</b>																								
MK as an independent state	51	34	3	14	19	7	0	12	27	9	1	17	16	3	0	13	30	6	4	20	143	59	8	76
MK as a part of Armenia	16	9	0	7	5	2	1	2	8	1	0	7	2	0	0	2	21	7	0	14	52	19	1	32
MK as a part of Azerbaijan	32	8	7	8	18	2	5	11	14	0	3	11	17	3	3	11	24	6	3	15	96	19	21	56
Any other option	23	5	6	21	24	1	1	22	10	0	0	10	21	0	1	20	46	2	2	42	133	8	10	115
<b>Total</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>424</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>279</b>
<b>Negotiation format</b>																								
Direct bilateral negotiations Armenia-Azerbaijan	44	28	2	14	23	11	0	12	62	25	0	37	47	8	1	38	39	12	0	27	215	84	3	128
Direct trilateral negotiations Armenia-Azerbaijan-MK	21	13	2	6	3	2	0	1	12	6	0	6	17	5	0	12	12	2	2	8	65	26	4	33
Direct negotiations Baku-Stepanakert	2	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	4	2	1	1
Negotiations mediated by an interested country(ies)	22	12	2	8	27	4	0	23	31	4	1	26	32	2	0	30	15	0	0	15	127	22	3	102
Negotiations mediated by an international organization(s)	11	9	2	0	5	3	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	2	19	13	2	4
Negotiations under the OSCE Minsk Group	135	71	13	51	75	20	1	54	61	14	0	47	110	17	1	92	66	11	1	54	447	133	16	298
<b>Total</b>	<b>235</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>208</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>172</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>877</b>	<b>282</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>566</b>
Consideration of MK issue in international (regional) structures	31	9	3	19	0	0	0	0	19	0	1	18	10	1	0	9	21	3	1	17	81	13	5	63
Related	3				0				1				0				2				6			
Nonrelated	5				0				1				0				0				6			
<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>13</b>
Media attitude to the possibility of Armenian-Azerbaijani interstate cooperation in different areas while the Karabagh conflict is unresolved	1	0	0	1	5	3	0	2	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	4	0	4
Media attitude to bilateral Armenian-Azerbaijani contacts and the interaction of various (non-governmental) organizations while the Karabagh conflict is unresolved																								
Own sources	339				201				269				256				258				1323			
Other Armenian sources	75				55				77				93				50				350			
Azerbaijani sources	7				5				8				7				9				36			
Karabagh sources	5				0				0				0				1				6			
Foreign sources	10				5				7				2				2				26			
Official documents	0				0				0				0				0				0			
<b>Total</b>	<b>436</b>				<b>266</b>				<b>361</b>				<b>358</b>				<b>320</b>			<b>1741</b>				
Event-oriented (news)	212				146				210				168				168				970			
Analytic	224				118				144				118				146				750			
<b>Total</b>	<b>436</b>				<b>264</b>				<b>354</b>				<b>352</b>				<b>314</b>			<b>1720</b>				

## MONITORING OF KARABAGH MEDIA

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### KARABAGH CONFLICT AND PROSPECTS OF ITS RESOLUTION

The monitoring of Mountainous Karabagh media "Karabagh Conflict and Prospects of Its Resolution" was conducted during five months, from March 1 till July 31, 2002.

The monitoring focused on one TV channel, Artsakh Television, and two newspapers - "Aparazh" and "Azat Artsakh".

**Artsakh Television:** state TV company, founded in 1988 by "ArtsakhTeleRadio" SCJSC. The air time periodicity is 1.5 hours daily. The newscast of Artsakh Television "Lratu" and "Open the Parentheses" information and analysis program were monitored. "Lratu" is aired once a day for six days a week (Monday-Saturday) at 18.30. "Open the Parentheses" is aired once a week (on Sundays) at 18.30. During the study period 129 issues of "Lratu" and 21 issue of "Open the Parentheses" program were aired. Within the monitoring period a total of 1,526 pieces was studied. Of these, 337 pieces were devoted to the problem of Mountainous Karabagh - 179 being fully devoted to the issue and 158 containing a mentioning of it.

**"Aparazh":** a newspaper, issued twice a month, founded in 1991 by Artsakh Central Committee of "Dashnaktsutyun" party. The volume is 8/A3 pp., the claimed circulation is 1,000 copies. During the study period 7 issues were published. Within the monitoring period a total of 171 publications has been studied. Of these, 22 publications were devoted to the problem of Mountainous Karabagh - 8 being fully devoted to the issue and 14 contained a mentioning of it.

**"Azat Artsakh":** a newspaper, issued three times a week in Armenian language and once a week in Russian. The newspaper was founded in 1998 by the National Assembly and the government. The volume is 8/A3 pp., the claimed circulation is 2,000 copies. The Armenian-language issues were monitored. During the study period 65 issues were published. Within the monitoring period a total of 1,098 publications was studied. Of these, 234 publications were devoted to the problem of Mountainous Karabagh - 78 being fully devoted to the issue and 156 containing a mentioning of it.

As mentioned above, the main newscast "Lratu" and "Open the Parentheses" information and analysis program were monitored on Artsakh Television. Out of the total number of pieces, studied during the monitoring period, 22.1% were devoted to the Mountainous Karabagh problem, of which 53.1% were fully devoted and 46.9% contained a mentioning of the issue.

In the course of newspaper monitoring a total of 1,269 publications was studied. Of these, 256 publications (20.2% of the total number of pieces) were devoted to the issue of Mountainous Karabagh, 86 (33.6%) being fully devoted and 170 (66.4%) containing a mentioning of it.


In total, during the monitoring 2,795 TV reports and newspaper publications, of which 593 (21.2% of the total number of pieces) were devoted to the issue of Mountainous Karabagh - 265 (44.7%) being fully devoted and 328 (55.3%) containing a mentioning of it.

The indicator of 21.2% (of the total number of pieces studied) shows that the Karabagh media display more interest towards the MK issue than the media of Armenia, where the MK issue can be found in 7.7% of all materials, and the media of Azerbaijan, where the same figure makes 6.1%. At the same time, the Karabagh media pieces, where the MK issue is mentioned only, exceed the proportion of pieces fully devoted to the subject. This is apparently due to the fact that the media of Karabagh address the conflict itself by its reflections in other spheres of social, political and economic life of MK. This trend was present in the findings of monitoring conducted in 2001.

Out of the total number of pieces on MK issue, studied during the monitoring, 16.9% focused on the conflict peaceful resolution (mostly displaying positive attitude) and only in 3.2% the military resolution was considered. The emphasis on the peaceful resolution could be seen in the majority of pieces during the previous monitoring, as well.


Table 1 below signifies the obvious prevalence of pieces on peaceful resolution (*herein the percentages of the total number of pieces on Karabagh issue are presented*):

**Table 1**



The monthly distribution (*Table 2*) shows that in newspapers the issue of military resolution to the conflict was not considered in June and July at all:

**Table 2**



It should be noted that all the mentionings of a war as a conflict resolution were a certain response to the announcements of the Azerbaijani politicians advocating the war.

In Karabagh media the status of MK as an independent state (*Table 3*) is most often discussed. The positive attitude to the option is expressed in 90% of the materials on the subject. Also, while the media view positively the unification with Armenia, too, the attitude towards being a part of Azerbaijan is negative. The findings of the last year monitoring were identical.

The different approaches displayed by the media of Karabagh, Armenia and Azerbaijan towards "any other option" are of interest. If the Armenian newspapers, in particular, "Azg", "Aravot", "Haikakan Zhamanak", consider other variants of MK status in 13.2%, 28.9% and 19.9% publications, respectively, the MK media do not actually address this subject. The Azerbaijani media refer to "any other option" in only 8 cases, that is, in 0.5% of all the recorded cases when the possible status of MK was considered.

*Table 3*

<b>Status of Mountainous Karabagh</b>	<b>Artsakh TV</b>	<b>"Aparazh"</b>	<b>"Azat Artsakh"</b>
MK as an independent state	14.8	68.2	50.9
MK as a part of Armenia	1.5	22.7	12.4
MK as a part of Azerbaijan	5	0	6
Any other option	0.3	0	0.4

The format of negotiations process as well as the consideration of MK issue in international (regional) structures does not receive much attention from the media (*Table 4*). This issue is addressed mostly by the television - in the up-to-date news pieces. The media discuss the negotiations process in the context of the necessity of MK involvement in it ("Direct trilateral negotiations Armenia-Azerbaijan-MK") in 5-6.8% of publications, with a predominantly positive attitude. As before, the preference is given to negotiations within OSCE Minsk Group. The attitude to this format, as well as the option of "Direct bilateral negotiations Armenia-Azerbaijan" is generally either neutral or positive. The media view the possibility of direct negotiations between Baku and Stepanakert only positively.

The issue of negotiations under the mediation of interested countries was touched on in the context of statements made by certain states on their readiness to act as mediators. At the same time interest towards conflict resolution on behalf of the international organizations was registered (Europarliament, NATO, etc.), as well as towards the discussion of the problem by various international (regional) structures. The involvement other countries and organizations into the negotiations process is generally favored.

*Table 4*

<b>Negotiation Format</b>	<b>Artsakh TV</b>	<b>"Aparazh"</b>	<b>"Azat Artsakh"</b>
Direct bilateral negotiations Armenia-Azerbaijan	9.2	0	2.1
Direct trilateral negotiations Armenia-Azerbaijan-MK	5	0	6.8
Direct negotiations Baku-Stepanakert	0.9	0	2.6
Negotiations mediated by an interested country(ies)	7.7	0	0.4
Negotiations mediated by an international organization(s)	1.8	0	1.3
Negotiations under the OSCE Minsk Group	27	13.6	22.2
Consideration of MK issue in international (regional) structures	12.2	0	4.3



The correlation between the Karabagh conflict and terrorism is almost never mentioned by media (1.5% of the total number of pieces on MK issue). However, if at the beginning of monitoring singular mentionings of the issue were made, but purely in the accusation of Armenia and MK of terrorism made by Azerbaijan, this was followed by the response accusations of Azerbaijan on behalf of Karabagh politicians.

There was little attention paid to the prospects of Armenian-Azerbaijani interstate cooperation in various areas while the conflict is still unresolved (Artsakh TV - 0.9%, "Azat Artsakh" - 0.4%). A bit more numerous are the pieces discussing the bilateral Armenian-Azerbaijani contacts and the interaction of various (non-governmental) organizations, the conflict being unresolved (Artsakh TV - 3.3%, "Azat Artsakh" - 1.7%), with a positive attitude to this cooperation. "Aparazh" newspaper has never addressed these two topics.


Karabagh media, especially "Aparazh", prefer to publish their own stories on MK issue (Table 5). Unlike "Azat Artsakh" newspaper, using information from other Karabagh media twice as often as information from Armenian media, the air of Artsakh TV presents an equal proportion of Karabagh and Armenian sources. Both these media were more active in addressing the Azerbaijani than foreign information sources.

**Table 5**

Information Sources	Artsakh TV	"Aparazh"	"Azat Artsakh"
Own sources	70.9	90.9	68.8
Other Karabagh sources	10.4	4.5	15
Azerbaijani sources	6.8	0	4.7
Armenian sources	10.7	0	7.7
Foreign sources	3	4.5	3
Official documents	0.6	0	2.1

On television, event-oriented information dominates, while analytic information prevails in newspapers - a phenomenon related to the specifics of the media channels (Table 6).

**Table 6**



**SUMMARY TABLE OF KARABAGH MEDIA MONITORING  
(ARTSAKH TELEVISION, "APARAZH", "AZAT ARTSAKH" NEWSPAPERS)**

*March 1 - July 31, 2002*

Content category	MARCH			APRIL			MAY			JUNE			JULY			TOTAL		
	Frequency of occurrence	Attitude		Frequency of occurrence	Attitude		Frequency of occurrence	Attitude		Frequency of occurrence	Attitude		Frequency of occurrence	Attitude		Frequency of occurrence	Attitude	
		Positive	Negative		Neutral	Positive		Negative	Neutral		Positive	Negative		Neutral	Positive		Negative	Neutral
Total number of pieces	518		0	609		0	560		568		540		2795		0			
Subject presence form	65			40			56		82		42		265					
Pieces fully devoted to MK issue				74			77		52		69		328					
Pieces partially devoted to MK issue	121			114			133		114		111		593					
Peace	27	23	0	11	11	0	27	25	1	1	12	0	19	18	0	1	100	89
War	5	0	5	0	4	0	5	0	2	3	2	1	0	3	0	2	1	19
Total	32	23	5	15	11	2	32	25	3	4	18	13	1	4	22	18	2	119
MK as an independent state	30	29	0	1	30	0	50	48	0	2	34	32	0	2	40	36	0	184
MK as a part of Armenia	10	9	0	1	9	8	10	10	0	2	2	0	0	8	6	0	2	39
MK as a part of Azerbaijan	11	0	10	1	4	0	5	0	4	1	10	0	9	1	0	1	0	31
Any other option	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Total	52	38	10	44	30	2	65	58	4	3	46	34	9	3	49	42	1	256
Direct bilateral negotiations Armenia-Azerbaijan	3	2	0	1	3	1	12	6	0	6	8	2	1	5	10	6	1	36
Direct trilateral negotiations Armenia-Azerbaijan-MK	11	11	0	0	3	2	10	10	0	0	4	4	0	0	5	1	4	33
Direct negotiations Baku-Stepanakert	2	2	0	0	4	4	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9
Negotiations mediated by an interested country(ies)	7	5	0	2	3	2	11	4	1	6	4	2	1	1	2	2	0	27
Negotiations mediated by an international organization(s)	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	5	0	1	1	0	0	1	2	1	0	9
Negotiations under the OSCE Minsk Group	46	29	3	14	25	8	23	15	2	6	32	9	1	22	20	8	1	146
Total	69	49	3	17	38	17	65	43	3	19	49	17	3	29	39	18	6	260
Consideration of MK issue in international (regional) structures	8	5	1	2	10	1	6	0	2	4	12	5	0	7	15	7	1	51
Related	3						0				0				0			3
Non-related	1						1				2				1			6
Total	4						1				2				1			9
Media attitude to the possibility of Armenian-Azerbaijani interstate cooperation in different areas while the Karabagh conflict is unresolved	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Media attitude to bilateral Armenian-Azerbaijani contacts and the interaction of various (non-governmental) organizations while the Karabagh conflict is unresolved	1	1	0	0	0	0	11	10	0	1	1	0	0	2	2	0	0	15
Own sources	100			80			93				70			77				420
Other Karabagh sources	10			17			14				19			11				71
Azerbaijani sources	3			3			9				9			10				34
Armenian sources	6			9			9				19			11				54
Foreign sources	2			3			8				1			4				18
Official documents	0			3			3				0			3				7
Total	121			115			136				118			114				604
Event-oriented (news)	82			75			88				88			70				383
Analytic	39			39			45				46			41				210
Total	121			114			133				114			111				593